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ABSTRACT 
Corporate tax management that reduces taxes paid has been linked in the media to social 
irresponsibility. This, in turn, can lead to corporate tax risk due to the potential 
reputational damage stemming from tax reduction being viewed as irresponsible. Perhaps 
due to this, management’s concern about managing corporate tax risk has increased in 
recent years. However, little empirical research has been conducted to assess whether 
consumers and investors naturally incorporate corporate tax management into their 
perceptions of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”). I experimentally examine whether 
this relation exists and to what extent it might impact investor and consumer behaviors. 
As a follow-up, I examine whether this relation is moderated by two factors: the country 
in which the tax management occurs and the availability of firm-issued CSR information. 
I find that managing corporate taxes downward has a significant negative relation with 
CSR perceptions. I further find that this relation is moderated by the availability of a firm-
issued voluntary CSR disclosure. I also find evidence that effective tax management 
negatively impacts non-professional investors’ willingness to invest in a company. 
Interestingly, I find no support that a firm’s tax management meaningfully changes 
consumer purchasing behaviors. Thus, while taxes paid may impact CSR perceptions, 
this impact does not appear to extend to behavior. Results from my study demonstrate the 
important role that corporate tax management and firm-issued CSR disclosures can play 
in influencing perceptions of CSR.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate tax and its relation with corporate social responsibility (CSR) has 
recently come under increased scrutiny. In part due to media leaks of corporate tax 
reduction strategies, reputational tax risk (arising from the public’s perception of the 
irresponsibility of corporations paying low percentages of tax) has reached a crescendo. 
At the same time, interest in CSR is growing steadily. For example, in 2007, there were 
approximately 100,000 news stories related to CSR. By 2017, this number had grown to 
almost 250,000 (Bialkowlski and Starks, 2017). Bialkowski and Starks (2017) find 
evidence that investor demand for socially responsible mutual funds has increased, 
primarily due to investors’ nonfinancial considerations. Corporate tax management1 is 
not normally included in traditional conceptualizations of CSR. However, the negative 
connotation of firms using tax management to reduce their tax expense may impact 
perceptions of CSR nonetheless. Little research has yet examined the relation between 
corporate tax management and CSR perceptions, despite this increased attention. Calls 
for investigation into this relation have been issued by researchers in both accounting 
(e.g. Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) and non-accounting business disciplines (e.g. Ylonen 
and Laine, 2015). For example, Ylonen and Laine (2015) state that, “in both the academic 
literature and the broader social debate, there are major disagreements with regard to 
whether corporate taxation should be considered an element of CSR or how the 
relationship between these two should be interpreted” (p.6). I therefore examine whether 
                                                             
1 Corporate tax management, also referred to as tax planning, refers to the company’s analysis of its 
business transactions from a tax perspective to be as tax-efficient as possible. Thus, it refers to the legal 
reduction of taxes through various legal tax strategies. 
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consumers and/or investors integrate tax management into their CSR perceptions. I then 
examine how this relation impacts purchasing and investing behavior.  
 Corporate tax management may impact CSR perceptions through its impact on 
perceived equity. As the amount of taxes paid decreases, benefits to the community 
through tax dollars decrease. This decrease in corporate-contributed benefits may skew 
public perception of the fairness of the firm’s tax reduction strategy. As CSR directly 
relates to the fairness of corporate business practices, CSR perceptions should then 
likewise be impacted. Thus, effective tax management may impact CSR perceptions. 
However, if the public views taxes as unfair or simply an expense to be minimized, tax 
management may not impact equity perceptions (or may even positively impact equity 
perceptions). 
 I also examine two potential moderators of the relation between corporate tax 
management and CSR perceptions. The first is the economic development of the country 
in which the tax management occurs. As suggested by Christian Aid (2009), developing 
countries are more vulnerable to tax reduction strategies than developed countries. 
Developing countries depend more on tax revenues to meet basic societal needs than do 
developed countries. However, these less developed countries often do not have the 
institutional resources to effectively fight tax reduction strategies, making them even 
more vulnerable to corporate tax management. I expect consumers and investors to be 
aware of the disadvantages that developing countries face and adjust their CSR 
perceptions and behavior toward the firm accordingly. More specifically, I expect CSR 
perceptions to be decreased further when a company reduces its taxes paid in developing 
countries than in developed countries. Due in part to the Base Erosion Profit Shifting 
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project, Country-by-Country tax expense reporting may become mandated in the near 
future. Thus, understanding how multi-national tax planning influences investor and 
consumer decisions is an important step towards understanding how companies and 
shareholders may be impacted by this impending regulation. The second moderator is a 
company-issued disclosure of other CSR information. Existing research has shown that 
CSR disclosures are associated with a reduced cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, 
and Yang, 2011; Richardson and Welker, 2001), a reduced likelihood of corporate 
misconduct (Christensen, 2016), and a greater reputational resilience in the face of 
negative exogenous shocks (Zahller, Arnold, and Roberts, 2015). However, no research 
has yet examined whether voluntary CSR disclosures can act as a reputational shield 
against tax risk. I expect the impact of tax management on perceptions of firm CSR to 
vary based on whether or not non-tax CSR information is disclosed by the company.  
To test my hypotheses, I conduct a 2x2x2 between-subjects experiment. 
Participants are given information about a target company and its respective industry. I 
manipulate the level of the target company’s tax management, the country to which the 
tax management relates (either a developed or developing country), and the presence or 
absence of a company-issued CSR disclosure. Participants are asked to evaluate the firm’s 
level of CSR and to indicate their willingness to invest in and purchase goods from that 
company. Analyses are conducted examining to what extent the manipulated variables 
impact the relation between the tax management and the dependent variables (CSR 
perceptions and willingness to purchase/invest). I recruit my subjects from TurkPrime.  
I find support that corporate tax management has a significantly negative relation 
with CSR perceptions. I also find support that the negative relation between tax 
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management and CSR perceptions is weaker when a firm-provided CSR disclosure is 
issued. Thus, firms may be able to use voluntary CSR disclosures as a reputational 
safeguard against negative backlash from tax management. 
I further find evidence that investors attempt to punish firms paying low levels of 
tax in developing countries by reducing their willingness to invest in those companies. 
Thus, investors appear to take the country’s level of economic development into account 
when incorporating corporate tax management into their investment decisions. My study 
is the first to find such differentiation in investor judgements.  
Interestingly, though, I do not find support that this impact on perceived CSR 
significantly influences purchasing decisions. This suggests that, while consumers view 
low corporate tax expense as irresponsible, they do not appear to alter their decisions. 
This is in contrast to the findings of Hardeck and Hertl (2014), who find that consumers 
are willing to change their purchasing behaviors as a result of media-framed reports of 
corporate tax reduction. It is possible, then, that the behaviors witnessed after the release 
of media-framed tax reports, such as boycotts, are driven more by media frenzy and social 
desirability than by individuals’ natural inclinations. Thus, in the absence of media 
framing, low corporate tax expense does not appear to elicit as strong of a response as 
previously believed.  
An experimental methodology is imperative in this study to overcome the 
limitations of archival data in CSR research (Huang and Watson, 2015). First, for 
example, I am able to directly measure perceptions about CSR to ascertain whether 
consumers and investors view corporate tax management as a component of CSR. 
Second, I am able to isolate the effect of corporate tax management and CSR disclosure 
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on consumer and investor decisions from potentially confounding factors that could 
impact such data in an archival study. Third, I am able to examine the impact of country 
development on CSR perceptions and consumer/investor decision-making. As country-
by-country tax expense reporting is not currently mandated, archival studies are unable 
to accurately assess country-specific tax expense; thus, examining how the tax expense 
paid in a developed or developing country impacts decision-making and CSR perceptions 
is difficult to accomplish archivally. However, my experimental methodology allows me 
to gain insight into the impact of country development on the relation between tax 
management and CSR perceptions/decisions. My study thereby provides greater insight 
into the drivers of consumer and investor decision-making than can be accomplished 
through an archival methodology.  
My study contributes primarily to the limited research on CSR perceptions and 
corporate tax management. To my knowledge, only two studies have thus far examined 
the relation. The first, Hardeck and Hertl (2014), examines consumer reactions to 
corporate tax reduction. They experimentally examine consumer reactions to media 
reports targeting corporate tax payments. Using a German sample, they manipulate 
whether subjects see a media report praising a company for responsible tax planning or 
shaming a company for attempting to minimize its tax burden. They find that consumers 
are less willing to purchase products or pay full price for products from corporations that 
have been shamed in the media for minimizing their tax liability. I extend this study in 
two primary ways. The first is my use of investors. While Hardeck and Hertl (2014) focus 
their study on consumer perceptions, I incorporate both consumers and investors in my 
study. This allows me to examine whether consumer and investor perceptions of CSR are 
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impacted differently by corporate tax management. The second is my use of a neutrally-
worded media report to discuss the firm’s tax management. Hardeck and Hertl (2014) use 
a framed media report in which the company’s tax activities are discussed in either a 
positive or negative manner. I extend on this by examining whether their findings are the 
result of the information contained in the report or the framing used in the report. I extend 
their results by examining consumers’ and investors’ natural reactions to corporate tax 
management. My study is thus the first to examine the impact of non-media framed 
corporate tax planning on consumer and investor CSR perceptions.  
The second paper, Davis, Moore, and Rupert (2017), finds some support for a 
negative relation between tax management and non-professional investor CSR 
perceptions. They find that, when a CSR rating is absent, tax management negatively 
impacts CSR perceptions. When a CSR rating is present, though, the impact of tax 
management is conditional on whether that rating is high or low. When the firm is given 
a low CSR rating, tax management is negatively related to CSR perceptions. When the 
firm is given a high CSR rating, though, investors no longer appear to incorporate the 
firm’s tax expense into their CSR perceptions. However, they use MBA students to proxy 
for investors. MBA students have been found to have an ethical idealism not found in 
more experienced individuals (Fischer and Rosenzweig, 1995; Smith, Skalnik, and 
Skalnik, 1999). As CSR is related to ethics in that they can both relate directly to equity 
perceptions, MBA students may limit generalizability. I thus contribute by using investors 
in my study to provide greater generalizability of their findings. Davis et al. also examine 
the relation between tax management and CSR perceptions from a domestic perspective. 
Given the significance of multi-national corporations to the global society (as well as the 
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increasing reputational tax risk that corporations are facing), understanding this relation 
in a global context is important. For example, Christian Aid estimates that $160 billion is 
lost every year by developing countries due to multinational tax planning (Christian Aid, 
2009). Given the country-by-country tax expense reporting (submitted to the taxing 
authority) required by the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative, public 
country-by-country disclosure is likely on the horizon2. Examining differences in how 
corporate tax management is perceived when conducted in countries of varying economic 
development is important for regulators as well as companies planning long-term tax risk 
minimization strategies. Thus, I build upon Davis et al.’s (2017) study by examining 
corporate tax management in non-U.S. countries. My study will also be the first to 
examine the ability of voluntary corporate-issued disclosures of non-tax CSR activities 
to protect firm reputation from reputational tax risk. Davis et al. (2017) find some initial 
support that a third-party CSR rating can influence how investors perceive tax 
management. If non-tax CSR information is able to impact investors perception of tax 
management, firm-issued voluntary CSR disclosures may influence perceptions similarly 
to the CSR ratings. However, as firm-issued disclosures are unregulated, they provide 
management with the opportunity to influence investors and consumers by overstating 
the company’s contributions to society. Thus, investors may not perceive them to be as 
trustworthy as third-party issued information. I thus extend Davis et al.’s (2017) study by 
examining firm-issued voluntary CSR disclosures. As CSR disclosures are not yet 
mandated in the U.S., understanding how the disclosures can be used to influence investor 
                                                             
2 Country by Country reporting is not yet required for public disclosure. Currently, media reports are the 
most likely source of corporate tax information by country.  
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and consumer behavior is important in determining whether the disclosures should be 
regulated. Thus, my study provides a meaningful contribution to the discussion 
surrounding CSR disclosure regulation. 
The remainder of my study is structured as follows. In Chapter II, I discuss the 
relevant literature for my study and develop my hypotheses. Chapter III discusses the 
methodology, sample, and primary variables used in the study. Chapter IV discusses the 
results of my experiment. Chapter V concludes.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility 
CSR can be defined as a company’s engagement in “actions that appear to further 
some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Thus, behaving in a socially responsible manner means 
a company adheres less to shareholder theory (Friedman, 1970). The firm no longer 
attempts to simply maximize shareholder wealth; rather, CSR leads a firm to adhere more 
closely to stakeholder theory, in which the firm looks to balance benefits between 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Carroll, 1991). These other stakeholders include a 
variety of parties, including employees, customers, venders, and society. Socially 
responsible firms still focus on profitability; however, they add to this focus an interest 
in being good corporate citizens. This additional focus leads the firm to make decisions 
that may reduce benefits to shareholders while increasing benefits to non-shareholding 
stakeholders in an attempt to balance the firm’s social responsibilities. This balancing act 
then creates competition for these benefits between shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and Ganapathi, 2007). Even so, 
the majority of publicly traded U.S. companies make at least some effort to engage in 
CSR (Watson, 2015).  
While CSR has become an increasingly prevalent social norm in recent years, 
businesses have been practicing CSR for centuries. For example, Parker (2014) conducts 
a historical analysis of socially responsible British industrialists of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. His analysis provides support that, not only is CSR not a new concept, but the 
underlying drivers of CSR engagement have largely remained consistent over time.  
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2.1.1. Drivers of CSR Engagement 
2.1.1.1. Manager Sense of Duty 
 The sense of duty that management feels towards CSR behavior is one predictor 
of CSR engagement. Parker (2014) finds this sense of duty in his historical analysis of 
19th century business leaders. Examining four leading businessmen in Britain, he believes 
that the men’s personal beliefs regarding philosophy, religion, and duty to society helped 
motivate them to engage in socially responsible business practices. This same CSR 
predictor has been found in more recent studies, as well. For example, Borghesi, Houston, 
and Naranjo (2014) find that management’s sense of altruism can predict CSR 
engagement, with female CEOs and younger CEOs being more likely to invest in CSR. 
Numerous other studies in both the accounting and management literatures similarly find 
that a firm’s engagement in CSR can be motivated by normative reasons such as 
management’s sense of duty, sense of stewardship, and morals (e.g. Bansal and Roth, 
2000; Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and Ganapathi, 2007; Davis, Schoorman, and 
Donaldson, 1997). CSR engagement can also be influenced when the firm incorporates 
management’s sense of duty into the firm’s mission (e.g. Bansal, 2003; Maignan, Ferrell, 
and Hult, 1999; Marcus and Anderson, 2006). Management is then no longer attempting 
to push its own sense of duty onto the firm; rather, the firm takes it upon itself to act 
responsibly, regardless of management. Thus, management’s sense of duty with respect 
to corporate stakeholders is a predictor of CSR engagement. 
2.1.1.2. Stakeholder Influence 
 While intrinsic motivation such as manager’s sense of duty can predict CSR, 
external motivation such as stakeholder influence can also drive CSR engagement. 
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Stakeholders, such as customers and creditors, have the ability to influence CSR behavior 
through their purchasing decisions and lending agreements, among other channels of 
power. Rodrigue, Magnan, and Boulianne (2013) conduct a series of interviews with 
executives from a large Canadian firm and document this stakeholder influence on the 
firm’s strategic performance measurement system. Through the interviews, they 
document that executives believe customers and creditors are concerned about 
environmental sustainability. Executives, in turn, react by attempting to provide a strong 
environmental management system while attempting to not compromise the firm’s 
product quality and price. Thus, stakeholders have some ability to influence CSR 
engagement. Pondeville, Swaen, and Ronge (2013) find more support for the influence 
of stakeholders. Surveying 256 manufacturing companies, they find that market, 
community, and organizational stakeholders motivate managers to be more proactive in 
the development of environmental management control systems. From these studies, it is 
apparent that CSR engagement can be motivated by stakeholder efforts. 
2.1.1.3. Firm Ownership 
 Another predictor of CSR engagement is institutional ownership. Gray (2010) 
argues that one needs to have a deep understanding of CSR to properly incorporate it into 
their valuation of a firm. Thus, institutional investors may be better able to account for 
CSR. Cho, Lee, and Pfeiffer (2013) find support for this argument. They find that, for 
firms with higher levels of institutional ownership, CSR performance does not 
significantly impact information asymmetry (proxied for by the bid-ask spread). 
However, for firms with lower levels of institutional investors, CSR performance reduces 
information asymmetry. Thus, institutional investors do not rely as heavily on CSR 
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information as non-institutional investors. This finding is consistent with institutional 
investors having a better understanding of CSR information and thus understanding its 
potential to be used as a signal of profitability. Given that institutional owners are better 
able to understand the implications of CSR, it makes sense that they can influence CSR 
behaviors. Indeed, prior research has shown that long term institutional ownership can 
positively influence CSR engagement (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Johnson and 
Greening, 1999).   
2.1.2. Impacts of CSR Engagement 
 Although CSR behavior shifts a firm’s perspective towards the benefit of all 
stakeholders (stakeholder theory), shareholder theory is still relevant. For a firm to benefit 
stakeholders, it must survive. In order to survive, the firm must behave in some capacity 
in the interest of shareholders. The idea of benefiting shareholders while simultaneously 
benefiting stakeholders may appear on surface to be a paradox; however, given the ability 
of CSR behavior to boost firm reputation, appeal to new customers and employees, and 
thereby ultimately increase profitability (Jones, 1995; Porter and Kramer, 2006, 2011), 
CSR may indeed benefit both parties.  
2.1.2.1. Firm Value and Performance 
 Prior research has shown that CSR engagement is positively related to both firm 
value and firm performance. For example, firms engaging in CSR activities may be better 
able to attract quality employees (Greening and Turban, 2000), have lower costs of and 
innovations in processes, and have improved corporate reputations (Sharma and 
Vredenburg, 1998), which can all lead to increased profitability. Waddock and Graves 
(1997) find support for a positive relation between CSR activities and return on assets, 
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return on equity, and return on sales. Mishra and Suar (2010), in their examination of 
CSR in Indian firms, find support that CSR activities are positively related to industry-
adjusted return on assets. Shank, Manullang, and Hill (2005) find that their portfolio of 
socially responsible firms has a risk-adjusted performance significantly higher than the 
expected market return over a ten-year period. Conversely, the returns from their portfolio 
of less socially responsible firms did not significantly differ from the expected market 
return. Thus, for investors, CSR engagement may signal long-term financial benefits. 
Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000) find that multinational firms engaging in CSR have 
higher firm values. Conversely, corporate social irresponsibility has been found to be 
positively and strongly related to financial risk (Oikonomou, Brooks, and Pavelin, 2012). 
Deng, Kang, and Low (2013) find evidence that acquirers with higher CSR scores show 
higher merger announcement returns and have better post-merger operating performance. 
Petersen and Vredenburg (2009) interview institutional investors and find that, while 
institutional investors are not willing to pay a premium for shares of CSR-active 
companies, they are in favor of owning shares in those companies. In a working paper, 
Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) conduct a meta-analysis of studies written 
between 1972 and 2007 that examine the relation between CSR and financial 
performance. Reviewing 251 publications, dissertations, and working papers, they 
conclude that there is a small, positive relation between CSR performance and financial 
performance. While they conclude that a stronger, negative relation appears to exist 
between being socially irresponsible and financial performance, their review supports the 
idea of a positive relation between CSR engagement and firm value. 
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Since Margolis et al.’s (2009) meta-analysis, more studies have been conducted 
finding further support for the CSR-firm value relation (e.g. Orlitzky, Schmidt, and 
Rynes, 2003; Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008, 2011; Guenster, Bauer, Derwall, 
and Koedijk, 2011; Edmans, 2011, 2012; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Servaes and 
Tamayo, 2013; Edmans, Li, and Zhang, 2014). For example, Flammer (2015) examines 
whether the market reacts to firms passing CSR proposals. He finds evidence that, when 
CSR-related shareholder proposals are passed, the market responds with positive 
abnormal returns. Jones and Murrell (2001), using an event study, find that firms named 
to Working Mother magazine’s “Most Family-Friendly Companies” list (a form of CSR) 
experienced abnormal positive returns from the market. Kansal and Joshi (2014) 
investigate shareholder and stockbroker perceptions of CSR initiatives in India. Through 
the use of surveys, they find that both shareholders and stockbrokers perceive firms 
engaging in CSR activities to be valued higher than firms not engaging in CSR. Recent 
findings by the Schroders Global Investor Study (2017) state that 64% of individual 
investors surveyed stated that they have increased their investment allocation to 
sustainable funds. Elliott, Jackson, Peecher, and White (2013) experimentally examine 
how investors incorporate CSR information into their assessment of firm value. They find 
that CSR performance increases investor perceptions of firm value. However, they also 
find that, when investors are asked to personally assess the firm’s CSR performance rather 
than relying on the provided CSR rating, this positive association diminishes. This result 
suggests that the positive impact of CSR on firm value may be the result of investors not 
explicitly assessing CSR performance and unintentionally adjusting their perceptions of 
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firm value. Overall, though, the literature appears to support a positive relation between 
CSR performance and firm value. 
 A caveat to the association between CSR and firm value/profitability is the issue 
of causality. Because the majority of studies examining this relation have not been event-
studies, it is difficult to ascertain whether CSR leads to firm value or firm value leads to 
CSR. Hong, Kubik, and Schneinkman (2012), for example, find that financial constraints 
significantly limit CSR engagement. Thus, firms may only be able to engage in CSR 
when they are performing well financially. Lys, Naughton, and Wang (2014) further 
examine this relation between CSR and future financial performance. They find a positive 
relation between current CSR expenditures and future firm performance (measured as 
both return on assets and operating cash flows). However, they also find that this relation 
is based upon CSR expenditures that are not associated with firm economics. Thus, these 
expenditures are greater than what would be expected based upon current firm 
performance. This suggests that current firm performance does not drive CSR 
expenditures; rather, CSR expenditures appear to be a signal of private information from 
management about future financial performance. Thus, more research is needed to 
establish causality between CSR and firm value/profitability.  
2.1.2.2. Firm Reputation/Legitimacy 
 Related to firm value, another impact of CSR performance is firm reputation or 
legitimacy. In exchange for firms engaging in CSR, firms may be perceived as legitimate 
and granted a social license to operate (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Adams, Hill, and 
Roberts, 1998; Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, 2004; Killian and O’Regan, 2016). 
This, in turn, should allow the firm to be more profitable. When a firm does not adhere 
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to these social norms, its legitimacy as a “good business” is called into question. Thus, it 
is in the firm’s best interest to comply with the social construct of CSR. Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975) point out that businesses are a part of society; as such, adhering to societal 
expectations of CSR is necessary for success and good for business. Thus, firm 
reputation/legitimacy appears related to CSR performance. 
 While the impact of CSR on individual perceptions has not been widely 
researched yet in the U.S., a few international studies have examined how consumers and 
other stakeholders perceive CSR engagement. Öberseder, Schlegelmilch, and Murphy 
(2014) examine consumer perceptions of CSR in a non-U.S. context through a series of 
in-depth interviews with consumers. In their attempt to create a measurement model to 
capture consumer CSR perceptions, they find that consumers view CSR as a multi-faceted 
concept, with certain facets being more important to their CSR perceptions than others. 
Most pertinent to this study, they find that perceived contributions to society (e.g. through 
taxes, employment, involvement in community projects) is one of the most predictive 
factors for consumer CSR perceptions. Kansal and Joshi (2014) find that shareholders 
and stockbrokers alike perceive CSR-engaging firms to be more reputable, thus 
increasing their confidence in those firms.  
2.1.3. Impact of CSR Disclosure 
Apart from CSR performance, the voluntary disclosure of CSR activities by 
companies also appears to provide benefits.3 This is great news for shareholders given 
                                                             
3 However, it is difficult to assess whether the benefits result from CSR activities themselves or the 
decreased information asymmetry and goodwill that come from additional CSR disclosures. 
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that nearly all of the Fortune 500 firms release CSR (a.k.a. sustainability) reports (Kanani, 
2012). The primary benefits documented by the literature are increased 
reputation/legitimacy, increased investor willingness to invest, and a reduced cost of 
capital.  
2.1.3.1. Firm Reputation/Legitimacy 
 CSR disclosures have the ability to provide a reputational boost to firms through 
their impact on the firm’s perceived legitimacy. For example, prior research has found 
evidence that companies can gain legitimacy through CSR disclosures (e.g. Deegan, 
Rankin, and Tobin (2002); O’Donovan (2002); Milne and Patten (2002)). Zahller, 
Arnold, and Roberts (2015) experimentally examine the impact of quality CSR 
disclosures on investor perceptions of firm legitimacy. They find support that quality 
firm-issued CSR disclosures not only improve perceptions of organizational legitimacy, 
but also protect the firm from negative investor reactions after an exogenous shock. Cho, 
Guidry, Hageman, and Patten (2012) find that this reputational boost extends even to the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI). They find that membership in the DJSI seems 
driven more by what firms claim to do in their CSR disclosures than by what the firms 
actually do. Thus, CSR disclosures appear able to provide a boost to firm reputation 
separate from what is seen from CSR performance. 
Prior literature has also found evidence consistent with firms believing that CSR 
disclosures can be used opportunistically to boost firm reputation in times of need. For 
example, Deegan et al. (2002) follow the disclosure policies of BHP Ltd. from 1983-1997 
and find that the company regularly issued positive CSR-related disclosures after negative 
media reporting. This finding is consistent with the company attempting to use CSR 
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disclosures opportunistically to restore firm reputation. Cuganesan, Guthrie, and Ward 
(2010) find evidence that companies in industries in which CSR is more common may 
choose to issue CSR disclosures to improve reputation rather than actually engaging in 
more CSR. Splitting the Australian food and beverage industry into sub-sectors based on 
socially perceived CSR, they analyze the content of each company’s annual report and 
website looking for statements regarding CSR. They then code these statements as being 
meant to either inform the public about organizational behavior changes, change public 
perception while not changing organizational behavior, or deflect attention away from an 
issue of concern. They find that companies in the high-CSR subgroup are more likely to 
use CSR disclosures to deflect attention and change perceptions without changing 
organizational behaviors as compared to companies in the lower CSR subgroups. Thus, 
companies appear to use CSR disclosures to some extent in an attempt to improve 
reputation. At this time, though, there is no empirical evidence that such a strategy works. 
2.1.3.2. Influence on Investment 
 Though not yet widely researched, another benefit of CSR disclosures is their 
potential influence on investment decisions. Barreda-Tarrazona, Matallin-Saez, and 
Balaguer-Franch (2011) experimentally examine how CSR disclosures impact 
investment decisions. They find that participants invest significantly more in a fund when 
they know about the sustainable nature of the fund. Thus, CSR disclosure may signal non-
CSR benefits for investors, further influencing investment decisions. 
2.1.3.3. Reduced Cost of Equity Capital 
A third benefit of CSR disclosures is their ability to reduce the firm’s cost of 
equity capital. For example, Dhaliwal, et al. (2011) examine the impact of initial CSR 
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disclosures on the cost of equity capital by measuring the cost of capital in the year before 
and the year after initiation of such disclosure. They find support that firms initiating CSR 
disclosure experience a reduced cost of equity capital, so long as those firms have positive 
CSR performance. Griffin and Sun (2013) find similar results in their archival study. 
Examining excess stock returns around a CSR disclosure announcement date, they find 
that shareholders of smaller companies with limited public information benefit from 
voluntary CSR disclosure. This finding is consistent with CSR disclosures helping to 
reduce information asymmetry for some firms.  
2.1.4. Consumer Reactions to CSR 
Consumer interest in CSR is increasing (Berens, van Riel, and van Bruggen, 2005; 
Nielsen, 2014). Overall, social irresponsibility appears to be viewed negatively. Social 
irresponsibility leads to fewer benefits for all stakeholders, including consumers. For 
example, when companies reduce their charitable contributions (reducing a commonly 
accepted form of social responsibility), consumers relying on those charities receive 
fewer benefits. Support for consumers’ negative perceptions of social irresponsibility 
come from various consumer surveys. Consumers appear to take social irresponsibility 
into account when making purchasing decisions. For example, Brown and Dacin (1997), 
using a series of experiments, find that participants lowered their evaluations of products 
when they believed the firm to be socially irresponsible. Using path analysis, they find 
that perceived social irresponsibility impacted participants’ product evaluations through 
its impact on their evaluation of the corporation as a whole. When participants perceived 
the company to be socially irresponsible, they lowered their perception of the firm’s 
reputation. They then lowered their evaluations of products made by that firm, not 
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because of qualities of the product, but because doing business with that firm became less 
appealing. Thus, their results are consistent with CSR impacting firm value through its 
impact on firm reputation. According to an article in USA Today (O’Donnell, 2013), nine 
out of ten consumers polled said they would boycott companies found to be socially 
irresponsible. Surveys conducted by research institutions find that consumers claim they 
are willing to pay more for products and services provided by socially responsible 
companies (e.g. Nielsen, 2014; Mohr, Webb, and Harris, 20014). For example, a recent 
global study conducted by Cone Communications (2015b) finds that ninety percent of 
consumers polled said they would boycott companies if they learned they had been 
irresponsible in their business practices. Ninety percent said they would switch brands to 
a more socially responsible brand if the product in question had similar quality and price 
(Cone Communications, 2015b). Another Cone Communications report stated that 80% 
of global consumers polled were willing to purchase from an unknown brand if that brand 
had high CSR (Cone Communications, 2015a). Creyer (1997) finds similar results in her 
study. In her survey, consumers report that the ethicality of a firm is important when 
deciding whether to purchase that firm’s product. Thus, consumers appear willing to 
change their purchasing behaviors based upon the perceived CSR of the company. 
2.2. Corporate Tax Management 
 Corporate tax management has also become a hot topic in recent news. From 
Apple Inc. to Starbucks, companies are being outed in rapid succession for using tax 
                                                             
4 Mohr et al. (2001) provided subjects with a company’s high-level environmental and philanthropic 
ratings to proxy for social responsibility. These ratings were either the highest or lowest in the respective 
industry. 
21 
 
management strategies (Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde, 2016). Tax management isn’t 
necessarily bad business, though. Corporations are expected to create wealth for 
shareholders. Prior to being distributed to shareholders, this wealth (firm profit) is subject 
to U.S. federal income tax. These taxes can reduce pretax profits by 35 percent without 
the use of tax management strategies. Thus, from a shareholder perspective, tax 
management involves using legal means to reduce a potentially large corporate expense. 
However, tax management also carries with it risk. Tax risk refers to the reputational risk, 
legislative risk, operational risk, and enforcement risk that can result from the exposure 
of tax practices (EY, 2014)5. Reputation risk in particular is moving to the forefront of 
corporate tax risk management plans (EY, 2014). Thus, when deciding to engage in tax 
reduction strategies, firms must consider the risks and rewards.  
2.2.1. Financial Performance 
Prior literature has documented both financial benefits and risks associated with 
tax management strategies. One obvious benefit of tax management is its ability to reduce 
tax liability (thereby reducing corporate tax expense) and increase firm profits. Wilson 
(2009) finds that the average tax shelter transaction, which is typically seen as a tax 
management strategy, generates $375.5 million of federal tax savings. Google, Inc. was 
able to reduce its tax expense by $3.1 billion over a three-year period by using tax 
                                                             
5 Reputational risk refers to the risk that a company’s reputation might be damaged as a result of greater 
tax transparency. Legislative risk refers to possible policy changes that may take effect as a result of the 
government’s knowledge of the company’s tax planning. Operational risk refers to the internal challenge 
of adhering to compliance requirements. Enforcement risk refers to the risk of a tax audit. 
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management strategies6 (Drucker, 2010). Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find evidence 
that firms use tax management in part to improve accounting outcomes. Robinson, Sikes, 
and Weaver (2010), in their survey of CFOs, find that corporate tax departments are more 
likely to be operated as profit centers when there are ample tax-planning opportunities, 
consistent with tax management increasing profits. Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 
(2014) survey 594 corporate tax executives and find financial incentives to be a driving 
factor behind using tax management strategies. Of these 594 executives, 32% state that 
tax management strategies are marketed to their firm as a way to increase earnings. They 
also find that 49% of those surveyed stated that it is important for a tax management 
strategy to increase EPS7. These results are consistent with tax management having the 
ability to boost financial performance and increase after-tax income.  
However, by using tax management strategies and having lower ETRs, firms also 
place themselves at risk. For example, the use of certain tax strategies could draw 
attention from the relevant tax authorities. This would result in a decrease in profitability 
by way of fines and penalties, as well as possibly additional “voluntary” taxes paid to 
regain some of the lost reputation. For example, Starbucks voluntarily forewent tax 
deductions to pay an additional £20 million in tax to the U.K. government after being 
publicly shamed for their tax management (Christians, 2013). Another risk associated 
with tax management is the risk of agency costs. For example, Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) 
find evidence that the risk of future stock price crash is positively associated with tax 
                                                             
6 Specifically, Google Inc. engaged in the strategy commonly known as the “Double Irish Dutch 
Sandwich”. 
7 The remaining 61% stated it was important that the tax strategy not reduce EPS. 
23 
 
management (proxied for by the use of corporate tax shelters). However, when the firm 
has greater external monitoring (proxied for by a combination of analyst following, 
institutional ownership, and anti-takeover provisions), this association is reduced. These 
results are consistent with managers using tax management to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors, such as hoarding bad news, in the absence of strong external monitoring. This 
results in greater risk to the firm and fewer returns for shareholders. Abdul and Holland 
(2012) find a negative relation between tax management and firm value using a sample 
of U.K. firms. This finding is consistent with agency costs, wherein the information 
asymmetry related to tax management results in moral hazard on the part of management. 
However, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find evidence that this agency cost can be 
mitigated by way of corporate governance. Specifically, they find that firms with high 
levels of institutional ownership have a strong, positive relation between tax management 
and firm value. Thus, when firms have stronger control over management, agency costs 
decrease, allowing tax management to increase after-tax income. However, absent this 
strong governance environment, agency problems can detract from the financial benefits 
of tax management.  
2.2.2. Firm Reputation 
 Aside from its direct effect on a firm’s financial performance, tax management 
can have an indirect effect through its impact on firm reputation. As a firm’s tax 
management increases, reputational tax risk grows. Due to the increasing potential for 
leaked corporate tax strategies8, reputational tax risk can be extremely costly to a firm 
                                                             
8 This increased potential of leaks comes from both the increasing prevalence of dedicated data hacking 
groups as well as the seeming increase in whistleblowers (e.g. LuxLeaks, the Panama Papers).  
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and its investors. The publicizing of tax management strategies can impose significant 
reputational damage on a firm. In turn, then, this reputational damage bleeds into the 
firm’s profits by impacting consumer demand, consumer willingness-to-pay9, and stock 
price. There is limited and conflicting evidence that tax management leads to reputational 
costs for firms, though. The archival literature has found evidence consistent with firms’ 
awareness of the potential for reputational damage. For example, Chen, Chen, Cheng, 
and Shevlin (2010) find in their study that family owners are more willing to forego the 
benefits of tax management strategies than their non-family counterparts. This finding is 
consistent with family-owned firms being more concerned with the reputational damage 
arising from publication of their tax management strategies. Austin and Wilson (2017) 
find empirical support that firms with valuable brands engage in lower levels of tax 
management. This finding is consistent with the responses gathered by Graham et al. 
(2014) in their survey of corporate tax executives. They find that 69% of corporate tax 
executives surveyed cited potential reputational damage as a key factor in their decision 
to not adopt a tax management strategy. Thus, it appears that firms believe tax 
management can negatively impact their reputation. Rego, Williams, and Wilson (2017) 
find evidence consistent with this reputational damage. Examining individual investors’ 
stock holdings, they find that these investors own less stock in firms with low effective 
tax rates (ETR). Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) similarly find that, on average, a firm’s stock 
price falls after news of its involvement with a corporate tax shelter breaks. Brooks, 
Godfrey, Hillenbrand, and Money (2016) fail to find evidence of such reputational 
                                                             
9 By willingness-to-pay, I am referring to the economic term describing the maximum amount a 
consumer is willing to pay for a good. It is also commonly referred to as the reservation price. 
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damage in their U.K.-based study. They find that news releases of corporate tax 
management strategies have little noticeable long-term effect on stock prices, suggesting 
that tax planning does not damage a firm’s reputation in the long-run10. Gallemore, 
Maydew, and Thornock (2014) similarly find that the negative market reaction resulting 
from news reports of the firms’ involvement in tax shelters systematically reverses within 
30 days of the report. They also fail to find evidence of long-term reputational damage 
from the tax shelter involvement on sales/sales growth, CEO/CFO turnover, auditor 
turnover, future ETR, and the firm’s inclusion on Fortune magazine’s Most Admired 
Companies list. Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver (2003) find similar results in their archival 
study. They find that, on average, when U.S. corporations reorganize in tax-haven 
countries, the average return is not significantly impacted in the long run. Thus, the 
evidence is mixed on whether or not tax management inflicts significant damage on a 
firm’s reputation.  
2.2.3. Consumer Reactions to Corporate Tax Management 
To my knowledge, only one study has so far examined consumer reactions to 
corporate tax management. Hardeck and Hertl (2014) experimentally examine consumer 
reactions to media reports targeting corporate tax management. Using a German sample 
comprised of undergraduate students, they manipulate whether subjects see a media 
report praising a company for paying taxes responsibly or shaming a company for using 
tax management to reduce its tax expense. They find that consumers are less willing to 
purchase products or pay full price for products from corporations that have been shamed 
                                                             
10 The exception to this finding is firms found engaging in tax shelter transactions. For these firms, share 
prices had a steeper and longer-lasting decline. 
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in the media for their tax management. However, it is difficult to determine whether the 
observed reactions are a result of the corporate tax management or the negative framing 
used in the media report to communicate the management. 
Despite a call by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), to my knowledge, no experimental 
research has been conducted to assess how investors and consumers naturally perceive 
tax management without media influence. My dissertation seeks to fill this gap and 
provide better insight into the potential reputational damage associated with the 
publication of corporate tax management. 
2.3. Relation Between CSR Perceptions and Corporate Tax Management 
Currently, little is known about whether corporate tax management is related to 
CSR perceptions. Insight into commonly accepted CSR-related activities can be gained 
through recommended CSR disclosure frameworks. The most beneficial of these 
frameworks (in regards to credibility and helpfulness to investors) comes from the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) (GreenBiz, 2013). One of the GRI’s suggested voluntary 
disclosures is tax activity (GRI, 2016). Specifically, the GRI recommends disclosing tax 
payments made to all governments by country, as well as related penalties (Disclosure 
201-1). These recommendations suggest that the GRI believes tax compliance to be 
related to CSR. However, a company can be compliant with tax laws while still engaging 
in varying degrees of tax management. Although tax management is not mentioned as a 
dimension of CSR, it may still impact CSR perceptions.  
The literature provides mixed evidence on whether companies believe tax 
management to be a component of CSR perceptions. For example, Davis, Guenther, 
Krull, and Williams (2016) examine the relation between CSR and cash ETR (a proxy 
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for tax management) and find that firms appear to use non-tax CSR activities as a 
substitute for tax payments. Specifically, they find that firms with higher overall levels 
of CSR have lower ETRs and thereby higher tax management. They posit that this result 
is consistent with stakeholders viewing CSR as a substitute for tax payments. This finding 
is also consistent with firms using non-tax CSR activities to mitigate the reputational tax 
risk from tax management. Landry, Deslandes, and Fortin (2013) find similar results in 
their study using Canadian firms. They find support that (non-family owned) firms with 
higher overall levels of CSR engage in more tax management and thereby have lower 
ETRs than their low-CSR counterparts. These results are again consistent with firms 
using non-tax CSR activities as a reputational shield against tax risk. Thus, firms may 
believe that engaging in non-tax CSR activities can moderate the impact of tax 
management on overall CSR perceptions (reputational tax risk). 
At this time, no study has examined whether or not consumers incorporate 
corporate tax management in their perceptions of CSR and only one paper has examined 
the same for investors. Davis et al. (2017), in a current working paper, provide some 
support for a relation between corporate tax management and CSR perceptions. Basing 
their predictions on affect-as-information theory, they find evidence that, when a 
company is given a low CSR rating by a third-party ratings agency, a company’s tax 
management (proxied for by ETR) is negatively related to investor CSR perceptions. 
However, due to their use of MBA students, their sample may not be generalizable to 
non-professional investors given MBA students’ ethical idealism (e.g. Smith et al., 1999). 
Fischer and Rosenzweig (1995) find evidence of this ethical idealism by examining 
differences in MBA student and accounting practitioner responses to earnings 
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management. They find that, for the manipulation of earnings through the timing of 
expenses, MBA students viewed the earnings management as significantly less ethical 
than did accounting practitioners. Deshpande (1997) finds corroborating results. 
Examining middle-level manager reactions to unethical behavior, Deshpande (1997) 
finds that managers with graduate degrees were more judgmental of unethical behavior 
than managers without a graduate degree. It is also likely that MBA students are impacted 
by the increased offering of graduate ethics courses. As a result of the accounting scandals 
of the early millennium, the AACSB issued a call for increased ethics education in 
business programs (AACSB, 2004). In addition, Davis et al. (2017) use a third-party CSR 
rating. Investors may trust this rating more than a firm-issued CSR disclosure. Thus, it is 
possible that investors will formulate their perceptions of CSR differently than Davis et 
al.’s (2017) sample due to the ethical connotations of CSR as well as their use of a 
potentially more trust-worthy CSR source. 
2.4. Equity Theory 
 A common theme in evaluations of both CSR and tax management is the concept 
of equity. CSR is built fundamentally around the idea of stakeholders being treated 
equitably. Similarly, low corporate tax expense raises the question of whether corporate 
tax management is fair to society. Most research regarding equity is rooted in equity 
theory (Adams, 1965). Equity theory posits that individuals expect comparable ratios of 
contributions and distributions across all members of an exchange. Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) dissect equity theory into two primary components: distributional equity and 
procedural equity.  
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2.4.1. Distributional Equity 
Distributional equity posits that individuals expect similar ratios of inputs to 
outputs in an exchange. What one party of an exchange contributes should be similar in 
magnitude to what they receive. This ratio is expected to be similar across all parties 
involved. This expectation leads to three distinguishable types of distributional equity: 
exchange, vertical, and horizontal. Exchange equity refers to equity between the 
exchanging parties. It is the belief that each unit of contribution deserves a set outcome. 
Thus, distributions should be predictable based upon the amount of the individual’s 
contribution to the exchange. Vertical and horizontal equity refer to equity across 
contributors. Vertical equity means that individuals with greater levels of resources 
should contribute more and those with lesser levels of resources should contribute less to 
an exchange. Horizontal equity means that individuals with equal levels of resources 
should make equal contributions to an exchange.  
2.4.2. Procedural Equity 
Procedural equity posits that the underlying procedures governing a distribution 
must be applied uniformly and fairly11. Per Leventhal (1980, p. 17), procedural equity 
refers to “an individual’s perception of the fairness of procedural components of the social 
system that regulate the allocative process.” Thus, this includes all parts of the exchange 
up until the actual distribution. Numerous studies have documented the direct effect of 
procedural equity on total equity perceptions (e.g. Latour, 1978; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, 
Walker, and Thibaut, 1980; Cropanzano and Folger, 1989; Folger and Konovsky, 1989; 
                                                             
11 For an earlier review of the procedural equity literature, see Lind and Tyler, 1988. 
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Folger and Martin, 1986; Tyler, 1984, 1986, 1990). Perceptions of procedural equity are 
a composite of several different components. For example, Leventhal (1980) and 
Greenberg (1986) both dissect procedural equity into seven components. Folger and 
Konovsky (1989) argue for twenty-six separate components. Generally, though, these 
components involve items such as: providing opportunity for parties of the exchange to 
provide feedback on the procedures; applying the procedures consistently; suppressing 
bias; using accurate information; and having the ability to correct a procedural decision 
if found to be inequitable.  
Most research regarding procedural equity focuses on exchanges with some type 
of authority. That authority creates a set of procedures for an exchange with individuals 
under the authority’s jurisdiction. Under this setting, procedural equity has the ability to 
convey the authority’s value of the affected individual (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and 
Lind, 1992). Thus, when procedures are perceived be inequitable, individuals may 
perceive this as a slight by the authority. This can then lead to commitment to and 
compliance with the system to suffer.  
2.4.3. Interaction of Procedural and Distributional Equity 
While both procedural and distributional equity are valuable in their own right, 
they both have the power to moderate the impact of the other. For example, procedural 
equity perceptions have the ability to moderate the impact of distributional equity 
perceptions on outcomes such as outcome satisfaction and commitment to group goals. 
Leventhal (1980) states that “evaluations (of procedural equity) affect the perceived 
fairness of the final distribution of reward” (p.20). Cropanzano and Folger (1991) 
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similarly suggest that “a full understanding of fairness cannot be achieved by examining 
the two constructs (distributions and procedures) separately. Rather, one needs to 
consider the interaction between outcomes and procedures” (p. 136). Numerous studies 
have found support for this supposition. For example, Greenberg and Folger (1983) find 
that trial defendants view verdicts positively when believed to be the result of equitable 
procedures. Greenberg (1987) finds that subjects receiving low pay levels viewed the pay 
as fair when equitable procedures were used. McFarlin and Sweeney (1992) find that, 
when procedures are perceived to be fair in an organizational setting, organizational 
commitment is high despite dissatisfaction with personal outcomes such as low pay. 
Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) document in their literature review the ability of 
procedural equity to moderate the impact of distributional equity when outcome fairness 
is low. Thus, procedural equity has the ability to moderate the impact of distributions.  
Distributional equity also has the power to moderate the impact of procedural 
equity perceptions. For example, Greenberg (1987) finds that subjects receiving high pay 
levels viewed the pay as fair regardless of the fairness of the underlying procedures. 
Shapiro (1991) examines the impact of different explanations for deception on 
participants’ perceptions of equity. Participants are told that they are applying for a bank 
loan with a partner. Should they be approved for a loan, they will receive $10. If they are 
not approved, they will receive $5. If either the participant or their partner is caught lying 
to the loan officer, though, participants are told they will receive nothing. The partner is 
caught to be deceptive. Participants are then randomly awarded either $10, $5, or nothing. 
They are also told that the partner lied either for selfish reasons, for altruistic reasons, or 
unintentionally. Shapiro finds that the distribution they received (either $10, $5, or 
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nothing) moderates the extent to which the various types of explanations moderate 
subjects’ feelings of procedural equity. In an organizational setting, McFarlin and 
Sweeney (1992) experimentally examine how distributional and procedural equity jointly 
predict employee satisfaction with personal and organizational outcomes. They suggest 
that, for personal outcomes such as pay, distributional equity may be a more important 
predictor of employee satisfaction and moderate the impact that procedural equity has on 
satisfaction. 
2.4.4. Exceptions to Distributional Equity 
 While equity theory posits that parties to an exchange are expected to be subject 
to similar rules and realize similar ratios of inputs to outputs, prior research suggests that 
equity perceptions may also be influenced by the varying perceived needs of the parties. 
Termed the social responsibility norm, this norm posits that allocations made based upon 
the relative perceived need of the recipient (rather than based upon a consistently applied 
ratio) may be viewed as equally fair as allocations made based upon respective 
contributions (e.g. Homans, 1961; Berkowitz, 1972; Pruitt, 1972; Leventhal, Weiss, and 
Buttrick, 1973; Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976). The social responsibility norm can 
commonly be seen in needs-based academic scholarships, the U.S. welfare system, and 
nonfamily transplant donors. 
2.4.5. Consequences of Inequity 
When an exchange is perceived be inequitable, either because of distributional or 
procedural equity perceptions, individuals will attempt to restore equity (Adams, 1965; 
Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978). To do this, individuals can either attempt to 
convince themselves that the situation is truly equitable or attempt to restore equity 
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themselves through their contributions. For example, using an experiment, Kim (2002) 
finds that taxpayers who perceive that they are treated inequitably relative to other 
taxpayers generally report less income. By reporting less income, these taxpayers alter 
the overall equity of the exchange. A number of studies involving taxpayers have also 
shown that taxpayers often alter their tax compliance to counter the perceived equity of 
the tax system (Wallschutzky, 1984; Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, 1984). Thus, when 
an exchange is seen as unfair, individuals will attempt to alter the exchange through 
whatever means are available. 
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Corporate Tax Management and CSR Perceptions 
I hypothesize that tax management negatively impacts CSR perceptions because 
it relates to the perception of equity, the fundamental core of social responsibility. 
Applying distributional equity theory to a tax setting, investors and consumers would 
expect corporations to pay levels of tax similar to those paid by other parties of the 
exchange (whether those parties be corporations or individuals). When that expectation 
is not met due to tax management effectively reducing tax expense, the tax expense may 
be viewed as unfair and socially irresponsible (e.g. Starbucks (BBC, 2012; Christians, 
2013), Ikea (Sheffield, 2016), Amazon and Apple (Chapman, 2017)).  
Given such limited research, whether investors and consumers take corporate tax 
management into consideration when evaluating a company’s CSR is at this point still an 
underdeveloped, multi-faceted question. However, given the similar ethical undertone of 
both CSR and tax management, I predict that tax management will negatively impact 
CSR perceptions. As such, my first hypothesis is formally stated as: 
H1: Corporate tax management is negatively related to investor and consumer 
CSR perceptions. 
3.2. The Impact of Corporate Tax Management on Consumer Behavior 
If corporate tax management is negatively related to CSR perceptions, it may as 
a result lead to changes in behavior. As discussed above, when faced with perceived 
inequity, individuals will attempt to restore equity through whatever means are available 
to them. If tax management reduces perceived CSR because it is perceived to be 
inequitable, consumers may attempt to restore equity to the exchange by punishing firms 
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reducing their tax expense through tax management. They may use boycotts or choose 
not to purchase the firm’s products/lower their valuation of those products when that firm 
engages in tax management to reduce tax expense, as suggested by Hardeck and Hertl 
(2014). If tax management lowers consumers’ CSR perceptions, it should create a similar 
behavior to that found by Hardeck and Hertl (2014) without the media framing. I thus 
hypothesize the following: 
H2: Consumers are less likely to purchase and will pay less for products from 
companies using tax management.  
3.3. The Impact of Corporate Tax Management on Investor Behavior 
 Non-professional investor12 behavior may also be impacted by CSR and equity 
perceptions. Specifically, I predict that corporate tax management may impact investment 
behavior in two separate ways. First, if tax management reduces perceived CSR because 
it is perceived to be inequitable and thereby a tax risk, investors’ may lower their 
valuation of the firm to accommodate that increased risk. Second, if they perceive the 
firm’s tax expense to be unfair, they may decrease their willingness to invest in that firm. 
I next expand on each of these possible predictions separately.  
                                                             
12 As the FASB’s disclosure framework focuses on how information will be viewed by a reasonable 
investor, decisions made by non-professional investors are of importance to the accounting practice. Non-
professional investors also represent a significant portion of share owners (Belzile, Fortin, and Viger, 2006). 
Non-professional investors are thus commonly studied in experimental settings (e.g. Elliott et al., 2014; 
Rennekamp, 2012). Because my study includes variables that may be included in disclosures in the future 
(country by country tax expense and CSR disclosure), I include non-professional investors in my study to 
speak back to both the practice and to legislators. 
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Equity perceptions can impact firm value (and profit) by impacting tax risk. When 
tax management strategies are perceived to be unfair to society, the offending firm’s 
reputation may suffer (i.e. reputational tax risk). This impact on reputation may then 
similarly impact the firm’s profitability by decreasing sales. Investors may seek to invest 
in firms with low reputational tax risk so as to minimize their own potential for loss. I 
thereby expect that investors will decrease their perceptions of CSR for firms engaging 
in more tax management than their peers. This then increases their perceptions of tax risk, 
which should decrease investor perceptions of firm value in a rational economic manner. 
I predict that this will result in investors perceiving a lower value for the stock of these 
firms. 
Equity perceptions may also impact investors’ willingness to invest by reducing 
investors’ willingness to be associated with the firm. If investors find tax management to 
be inequitable, it may lead investors to reduce their perceptions of the firms’ social 
responsibility. Moreover, if the investors believe the firm is inequitable, they may be less 
willing to be associated with that firm from a punitive standpoint. Rather than basing their 
investment decision on the firm’s financial merits, investors may choose to not invest in 
the firm because they do not want to be associated with what they perceive as an 
irresponsible firm. I thus predict that investors will be less likely to invest in these 
companies. 
Based upon investors’ equity perceptions of the firm, I predict that investors will 
value firms engaging in less tax management higher than firms engaging in more tax 
management to compensate for the additional risk. I also predict that investors will act 
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punitively by being less likely to invest in firms that manage their taxes downward. 
Formally stated, my third hypothesis is:  
H3: Investors are less likely to invest in and perceive a lower value for companies 
engaging in tax management. 
3.4. The Moderating Effect of Economic Development 
Other variables may moderate the relation between corporate tax management and 
CSR perceptions. One such variable is the country in which the tax management occurs. 
Multi-national enterprises (MNEs) operate globally, providing the opportunity for taxes 
to be paid to both developed and developing countries. Developing countries are 
generally less wealthy than developed countries. As such, they have more difficulties in 
meeting basic human needs through tax revenues (Christian Aid, 2009). Thus, the 
country’s perceived level of need may moderate the impact that tax management (which 
leads to a reduction in tax revenues) has on CSR perceptions.  
Applying the social responsibility norm to a multinational setting, individuals may 
view corporate tax management as less fair when perpetrated in developing countries than 
in developed countries. This perception of fairness, based upon the country in which the 
tax management is occurring, should then moderate the relation between perceived CSR 
and tax management. This moderation is expected to lower CSR perceptions for 
companies engaging in greater amounts of tax management in developing countries 
compared to developed countries. This interaction should impact consumer and investor 
behavior accordingly. Formally stated, my fourth hypothesis is: 
38 
 
H4a: The effect of tax management on investor and consumer perceptions of CSR 
will be moderated by the country’s level of economic development. 
H4b: The effect of tax management on consumers’ willingness to pay for and 
purchase products from MNEs will be moderated by the country’s level of 
economic development.  
H4c: The effect of tax management on investors’ perceived value and willingness 
to invest in MNEs will be moderated by the country’s level of economic 
development.  
3.5. The Moderating Effect of Disclosing Other CSR Activity 
 Despite the benefits of increased perceptions of equity and CSR, corporations may 
be unwilling to use less tax management and increase their tax payments to influence 
these perceptions and reduce tax risk given the significant portion of corporate profits 
that already go towards taxes. However, drawing attention to the company’s other, non-
tax CSR contributions through voluntary disclosure may provide a reputational barrier 
against negative perceptions from corporate tax management.  
 Using CSR activities as a reputational shield may work in part because CSR 
activities act as additional inputs to the company’s exchange with society. Thus, the CSR 
activities help to balance the exchange equity. This should lead to consumers and 
investors perceiving the exchange as more equitable. This increase in perceived equity 
may then lessen consumer/investor sensitivity to corporate tax management, thereby 
acting as a reputational shield.  
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No work has yet been done to establish whether disclosing non-tax CSR activities 
is an effective reputational shield against tax risk. If engagement in non-tax CSR activities 
can moderate the relation between tax management and CSR perceptions, so too might 
the disclosure of such activities. As CSR disclosures are typically provided voluntarily 
by management, they may be viewed as opportunistic rather than altruistic. Currently, the 
disclosures are unregulated and unaudited. Despite this, these voluntary disclosures may 
still have the power to act as reputational safeguards. By disclosing information about 
non-tax CSR activities, firms may be able to boost consumers’ and investors’ CSR 
perceptions in the face of negative tax press. By publicizing the firm’s commitment to 
non-tax CSR activities, the firm may be able to increase its perceived contributions to the 
exchange between themselves and the government/community and increase perceptions 
of equity.  
My fifth hypothesis thus examines the ability of a CSR disclosure to act as a 
reputational shield from the reputational tax risk associated with tax management. 
Specifically, I predict both a direct effect of CSR disclosure and an interaction effect. I 
predict that a CSR disclosure will have a direct positive effect on CSR perceptions due to 
its predicted ability to increase the corporation’s perceived contributions to society. 
Furthermore, I predict that a CSR disclosure will interact with tax management to provide 
more reputational shielding as tax management increases. When a firm engages in low 
levels of tax management, the disclosure should increase the perceived equity of the 
corporation’s tax expense. As tax management increases, so too should the reputational 
benefits associated with the CSR disclosure. I again expect consumer and investor 
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behavior to adjust accordingly for the proposed interaction. Formally stated, my fifth 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H5a: The effect of tax management on investor and consumer perceptions of CSR 
will be moderated by the presence of a firm-issued CSR disclosure.  
H5b: The effect of tax management on consumers’ willingness to pay for and 
purchase products from MNEs will be moderated by the presence of a firm-issued 
CSR disclosure. 
H5c: The effect of tax management on investors’ perceived value for and 
willingness to invest in MNEs will be moderated by the presence of a firm-issued 
CSR disclosure.   
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
4.1. Independent Variables 
 To test my hypotheses, I use a 2x2x2 (ETR X country X non-tax CSR disclosure) 
between-subjects experimental design13. I use firm ETR as a proxy for corporate tax 
management. The ETR variable is manipulated at two levels relative to the industry 
average ETR. The target company’s ETR is set to either 25% (average tax management 
compared to an industry average ETR of 25%) or 15%. Rather than using GAAP ETR as 
my metric, as many other studies have chosen to do, I use a country-specific ETR 
published in a neutral media report. This was done to more closely simulate the recent 
media reports outing corporate tax avoiders. These media reports typically discuss 
corporate ETRs in a single country. As this information may soon become even more 
readily available due to the BEPS project, utilizing a country-specific ETR also allows 
me to gain valuable insight on the potential consequences of public country-by-country 
tax reporting.  
The country variable is manipulated at two levels, with the country in which the 
corporate tax management has occurred being either economically developed (Germany 
                                                             
13 My experimental design is a 2x2x2. I could use a Latin Square design to reduce my number of cells and 
better approximate my planned analyses. However, the additional data is easy to collect at this point. 
Although I do not predict a three-way interaction, one may exist. By collecting the data, I am able to 
examine the three-way interaction and assess its implications regarding my predictions. 
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or the U.K.) or developing (Guatemala or Indonesia14). I use two countries from each 
category to ensure that participants’ strong feelings towards any particular country do not 
significantly impact my results.  
The non-tax CSR information variable is also manipulated at two levels, with 
some participants receiving firm-issued CSR information about the firm’s activities in the 
respective country and others receiving no such information.  
4.2. Design and Procedures 
 Participants are asked to evaluate a hypothetical company on how socially 
responsible they perceive the company to be and how willing they would be to purchase 
the company’s product and/or stock. My instrument begins with basic background 
information about a target company and its respective industry. Participants are told that 
the target company operates in the athletic wear industry. They are also told where the 
target company is currently positioned within that industry in terms of brand recognition, 
quality, and price. Participants are also provided with a short financial summary, 
consisting of the current year earnings, a brief Balance Sheet, and comparisons across 
industry for earnings growth, EPS, and current stock price. However, the target 
company’s stock price is not provided at this stage.  
                                                             
14 Both the developed and developing countries were chosen based upon their inclusion in the OECD’s 
listing of economically developed and developing countries. Per my pilot study, results across the two 
countries in each manipulation were not significantly different. 
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 Next, participants are given a neutrally-worded media report15 stating the 
company’s ETR in a specific foreign country (either developed or developing). This 
report also provides the industry average ETR in that country.  
 Participants in the CSR Report Present condition are also provided with a brief 
press release issued by the company16, providing information regarding other CSR 
activities in which the firm engages. This report, though brief, contains information 
regarding charitable giving, employee safety, sustainability, and supply chain 
management (including anti-bribery and avoiding child labor). These four activities were 
selected to provide participants with a wide array of activities to provide a strong 
manipulation. 
 After viewing the above information, participants are asked a series of questions 
designed to address my hypotheses. They are asked how socially responsible they believe 
the target company to be, for how much they expect the company’s product to sell, and 
how likely they would be to purchase the company’s product assuming a reasonable price. 
They are also asked to provide a stock price estimate for the target company within the 
range of $30 per share to $55 per share, as well as their likelihood of investing in the 
                                                             
15 This media report is based on the media report issued regarding Starbucks’ tax management in the U.K. 
However, I have removed any accusatory or negative language from the report in order to present a neutral, 
yet realistic, media report. 
16 The order in which participants receive the media report and press release is randomized across 
conditions. 
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company17. While all participants are asked these investment questions for simplicity, 
only the answers provided by the investor sample are analyzed. 
 Participants are next provided with manipulation check questions. The first asks 
participants to choose in what country the media report said the company had paid taxes. 
The second asks participants to choose what percentage of profits the company had paid 
in that country in taxes. The third asks in what other community-driven activities the 
company was investing per their press release. Only one possible answer for this question 
was present in the CSR report (charitable giving). Participants are then provided with 
construct validity check questions. They are asked how tax aggressive they believe the 
company to be, how economically developed they perceive the respective country to be, 
and how socially responsible they perceive charitable contributions. Participants are then 
asked to provide insight into their answers, answering on a scale from “None at All” to 
“A Great Deal” to what extent the target company’s tax payments had impacted their 
choice of stock price/willingness to invest, their choice of product price/willingness to 
purchase, and their assessment of the company’s CSR.  
 The remaining questions attempt to capture the participants’ views of corporate 
tax planning, CSR, and the corporation’s responsibility to pay taxes, as well as other 
                                                             
17 Asking investors to provide a stock price estimate will provide insight into their perception of the firm’s 
potentially reduced value due to the tax risk. Asking investors their likelihood of investing in the company 
will provide insight into their perceptions of the firm’s equity. An investor may, based upon risk, perceive 
a stock price to be fair. However, if the investor perceives the company to be socially irresponsible / 
inequitable, their willingness to invest in that company should decrease even at the perceived reasonable 
price per share. 
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control questions. I ask participants both their economic and political views to control for 
the impact that those views may have over my results, as well as participants’ age, 
household income, and gender. Participants are also asked about their educational 
background, such as the number of accounting and finance courses taken, and their 
personal beliefs regarding their duties to pay taxes.  
4.3. Participants 
 Using TurkPrime, I recruit 447 participants. Of these participants, 206 are non-
professional investors. The remainder (241 participants) are members of the general 
public. To capture the investor sample, I enlist TurkPrime to screen candidates for 
investment experience. Candidates who invest in the stock market either in their spare 
time or through their employer via an employee purchase/retirement plan18 are admitted 
into the study as investors. I then do an additional screening of those participants to verify 
their qualification by asking them about their investment experience and knowledge at 
the end of the instrument. I utilize a short quiz to assess investment knowledge. 
Specifically, I ask participants true or false questions regarding the meaning of short-
selling stocks, efficient stock markets, dividends, IPOs, compound interest, and growth 
strategy mutual funds. Participants either stating that they have no current investments or 
                                                             
18 Investment through an employer may allow the individual to invest without performing any investment 
analysis. Thus, the individual may not be qualified as a non-professional investor. However, as I further 
screen participants by using an investment knowledge quiz, I am confident that all individuals in my 
investment sample have relevant investment knowledge suitable to a non-professional investor. 
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demonstrating insufficient investment knowledge19 are omitted from the study. No such 
screening was done for the general public sample.  
For the above samples, I paid TurkPrime $3.75 for each investor and $3.25 for 
each member of the general public. On average, my instrument took participants 14.6 
minutes to complete, with a median time to complete of 10 minutes. See Table 1 for the 
overall demographic profile of my full sample and Table 2 for the demographic profile 
by sample group. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 I conduct a series of t-tests and chi-square tests between the investor sample and 
consumer sample to compare the characteristics of the two groups. As expected, the two 
groups do significantly differ on age, income, education, college major, experience, and 
gender. The mean age of the investor sample is 41.9 years (standard deviation of 12.8 
years), while the mean age of the consumer sample is 44.5 years (standard deviation of 
16.3 years). The investor sample has significantly higher income (mean of $93,798; std. 
dev. of $55,898) than the consumer sample (mean of $67,448; std. dev. of $51,836). The 
average investor has completed some graduate school and has analyzed financial 
statements two to four times, while the average consumer holds an associate’s degree and 
has analyzed financial statements only once. Lastly, the two groups significantly differ 
                                                             
19 As I am assessing non-professional investors, I do not expect participants to correctly answer all questions 
on the quiz. Thus, I classify insufficient investment knowledge as missing all questions on the investment 
quiz. So long as participants answer at least one question correctly, I include them in my sample.  
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on gender makeup. While 71% of the recruited investors are male, only 34% of the 
recruited consumer sample are male.  
4.4. Pilot Test 
 Before conducting my full experiment, I perform a pilot test using 42 students 
from an undergraduate accounting course at a large public university20 and an additional 
40 participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk. This pilot test differed from my final 
instrument in the manipulation of tax management. In the pilot test, the tax management 
manipulation was operationalized by presenting participants with a company paying an 
ETR of either 15% (very low ETR) or 22% (average ETR). However, participants in the 
pilot study did not perceive these two levels of tax management to be significantly 
different, undermining the validity of my construct. In the final instrument, I have 
strengthened this manipulation by using an ETR of 25% to represent the average ETR 
condition rather than 22%.  
 Overall, results of the pilot test support three of my hypotheses and fail to support 
two of my hypotheses. Using ANOVA, I find a significant main effect of tax management 
on CSR perceptions despite participants’ consciously answering that the levels of tax 
management did not differ. Thus, H1 is supported. Despite participants not being 
consciously aware of their differentiation in ETRs, the results suggest that they 
subconsciously viewed the two levels of tax management differently. Using planned 
                                                             
20 I recruited a total of 44 undergraduate students to participate. Of these students, 2 failed more than one 
manipulation check question. As this equates to a 4.5% failure rate, the manipulation is deemed salient. 
Inclusion of the 2 students does not significantly impact results. 
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contrast weights, I find a significant interaction between tax management and country 
development, supporting H4a. I similarly find a significant interaction between tax 
management and the presence of a CSR report using planned contrast weights. H5a is 
thus supported. However, I fail to find support for my second or third hypotheses, as well 
as H4b, H4c, H5b, and H5c. These hypotheses are regarding consumer and investor 
behavior. I speculate that this result is due to a lack of power as a result of my small pilot 
test sample size. 
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5. ANALYSES AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Test of Random Assignment 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions (i.e. average/low 
ETR, developed/undeveloped country, and present/absent CSR report). I use ANOVA to 
examine whether the participants are randomly assigned with regards to my control 
variables. I separately set each control variable (with the exception of gender) as the 
dependent variable in the ANOVA and set my three manipulations and their interactions 
as the independent variables. This allows me to identify whether any manipulation 
conditions differ on any one control variable. I find no significant differences for income, 
experience looking at financial statements, education, or beliefs about corporate duty21 
across the manipulations. Thus, I conclude that participants are randomly assigned for 
these variables. I find that my economically developed country manipulation was not 
evenly dispersed with regards to participant age. As such, I include Age as a variable in 
my hypothesis testing. To test for the random assignment of gender, I utilize a chi-square 
test. The results of this test are insignificant; thereby, I conclude that participants are 
randomly assigned to my manipulations with regard to gender. See Table 3 for the cell 
means. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                             
21 For participant beliefs about corporate duty, I follow Davis et al. (2017) in using a 9-question scale asking 
various questions about whether a corporation is responsible to shareholders or stakeholders. I code the 
shareholder-focused questions as positive scores and the stakeholder-focused questions as negative scores. 
I then net the shareholder- and stakeholder-focused responses to identify whether the participant believes 
corporations should be more shareholder or stakeholder oriented. 
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5.2. Manipulation and Construct Validity Check Questions 
 Overall, my manipulations were salient. Of 495 total participants, 109 participants 
incorrectly answered the question regarding in which country the company was said to 
have paid taxes. When asked about the company’s ETR, 91 participants answered 
incorrectly. Only 40 participants incorrectly answered the question regarding the 
community-driven activities in which the company was investing. Participants who 
correctly answered all three manipulation questions spent a mean of 14.2 minutes 
(standard deviation of 20.2 minutes; median of 11.0 minutes), while participants missing 
only one question spent a mean of 15.6 minutes (standard deviation of 61.4 minutes; 
median of 7.9 minutes). Participants missing two of these manipulation questions spent 
significantly less time on the instrument at 7.0 minutes (standard deviation of 8.0 minutes; 
median of 4.4 minutes). Participants missing all three questions were not allowed to 
proceed any further in the instrument, so the average time spent is unavailable for those 
subjects. However, it is likely that those participants, along with those missing two 
questions, did not pay adequate attention to the information as suggested by the lower 
amount of time spent. Thus, participants were retained if they were able to correctly 
answer two of these three questions. Of 495 total participants, 48 subjects failed to answer 
more than one manipulation check question correctly. This represents a failure rate of 
9.7%. These subjects were randomly distributed amongst conditions, with no particular 
condition resulting in significantly more or less failures. These 48 participants were 
removed from the analyses, leaving a total of 447 participants in my sample.  
 Participants were also asked two construct validity questions: how economically 
developed they perceived their manipulated country and how aggressive they perceived 
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the company to be with its tax planning. Answers for the development question ranged 
from Not at All (1) to Fully Developed (5) and answers for the ETR question ranged from 
Not Aggressive at All (1) to Extremely Aggressive (7). For the economic development 
question, participant responses were significantly different (p<.0001) based upon 
condition. In untabulated results, the mean for participants in developing countries was 
2.6864 (standard deviation of 0.9589), while the mean for participants in developed 
countries was 4.0573 (standard deviation of 1.0396)22. Thus, participants presented with 
a developed country (either Germany or the U.K.) perceived that country as economically 
developed. Participants presented with a developing country (either Guatemala or 
Indonesia) perceived that country as still in development.  
For the tax management construct, participant responses were again significantly 
different (p<.0001) based upon condition. In untabulated results, the mean for participants 
in the high tax management condition was 4.8120 (standard deviation of 1.2425) while 
the mean for participants in the average tax management condition was 4.0892 (standard 
deviation of 1.4428)23. Participants presented with an average ETR (25%) perceived the 
                                                             
22 The mean for Guatemala (2.5490; s.d. of 0.8632) was significantly different from the mean for Indonesia 
(2.8051; s.d. of 1.0233). The mean for the U.K. (3.8750; s.d. of 1.0832) was also significantly different 
from the mean for Germany (4.2348; s.d. of 0.9673). However, results are not significantly different when 
either particular country is used exclusively. Thus, in the proceeding analyses, participants receiving either 
Indonesia or Guatemala are in the developing country condition and participants receiving either the U.K. 
or Germany are in the developed country condition. 
23 Because the means for both ETR conditions were close to the midpoint of the response scale, I repeated 
all analyses using only the top and bottom terciles of ETR-aggressiveness perceptions from each 
condition. Results, though stronger, were not significantly different.  
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target company to be significantly less egregious with their tax management than 
participants presented with a lower ETR (15%).  
5.3. Primary Analyses 
While I independently collect an investor sample and a general public sample, I 
am aware that my investors are a part of the general public. Similarly, some of my general 
public sample may have experience as investors. As such, I use the combined sample for 
my analyses regarding consumer behavior24. However, I examine for a potential 
moderating effect from the included investors. For the investor behavior analyses, I first 
run all analyses with my sample of investors. I then add to this sample members of the 
general public who claim investment experience and meet or exceed the mean score of 
the investor sample on the investment knowledge quiz. I then run all analyses again with 
this larger sample. Results are not significantly different and, as such, the following 
discussion is based upon the initial sample split.  
As many of my control variables are highly correlated with each other (namely, 
experience, education, income, and gender), I use stepwise regression to determine which 
control variables increase the significance of the model for each of my dependent 
variables. See Table 4 for a correlation table of these variables. Stepwise regression 
includes variables into the model if their squared partial correlations exceed the 
predetermined F-value necessary for inclusion (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984). Variables 
are included into the model one at a time, beginning with the variable that results in the 
                                                             
24 I use both investing and non-investing consumers in my sample to better generalize to the U.S. consumer 
population. 
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highest F-value. Once a variable is included in the model, it is removed if and when the 
inclusion of another variable results in the F-value contributed by the initial variable to 
fall below the predetermined F-value requirement. Using stepwise regression allows me 
to identify the control variables that result in the highest R2 for the model. The identified 
control variables are then included in the proceeding analyses.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
5.3.1. Analysis of CSR Perceptions 
 My first hypothesis predicts that corporate tax management impacts perceptions 
of CSR. I use ANCOVA to test this prediction. See Table 5 for my results. Controlling 
for my two predicted moderators, I find a significant main effect of tax management on 
CSR perceptions (p=.057925).26 As the tax management increases, CSR perceptions 
significantly decrease overall. H1 is thereby supported.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 I further predict that the negative impact of corporate tax planning on CSR 
perceptions will be greater when the tax planning occurs in economically undeveloped 
countries (H4a). Using ANCOVA, I find an insignificant interaction between the level of 
                                                             
25 Unless otherwise stated, all reported p-values are two-tailed. 
26 In untabulated results, I include a dummy variable for my investor sample to determine if investors 
incorporate tax management into their CSR perceptions differently than consumers. I interact this dummy 
variable with my tax management variable (ETR), as well as the interactions with country development 
and CSR disclosure. All interactions with this dummy variable provide insignificant p-values. Thus, I fail 
to find evidence that investors and consumers do not similarly incorporate corporate tax management into 
their CSR perceptions. 
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economic development and tax management when no CSR disclosure is provided 
(p=0.8501). However, as the interaction I predict is ordinal, I use contrast coding to 
supplement my ANCOVA. See Table 5, Panel C for the results of my contrast coding. 
The contrast codes used are derived from my hypothesis. I apply my contrast codes across 
my country conditions, regardless of CSR disclosure condition. I predict that CSR 
perceptions will be highest when companies engage in low levels of tax management. I 
do not predict any significant difference between country level of development when tax 
management is low. Thus, I assign a code of 1.5 to the low tax management conditions 
in both developed and developing countries. I predict that the negative impact on CSR 
perceptions will be strengthened when the country is still developing economically. Thus, 
as tax management increases, I predict that CSR perceptions will decrease more in 
developing countries than in developed countries. For the high tax 
management/developed country condition, I assign a code of -1 to represent the negative 
impact of the increased tax management. For the high tax management/developing 
country condition, I assign a code of -2 to represent the predicted greater negative impact 
of the increased tax management compared to its impact in the developed country. See 
Figure 1 for my predicted contrast codes. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Using my planned contrast weights for my cell means, my hypothesis test is 
significant (F=4.78, p=0.0292). See Figure 2. Thus, I find support that the effect of tax 
management differs across country conditions. I thereby analyze the simple effects of tax 
management at each level of my country condition. Specifically, I look to ascertain 
whether tax management has a meaningful impact in developing countries and developed 
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countries. To do this, I first examine whether greater tax management leads to lower CSR 
perceptions in developed countries by coding the high tax management condition as -1 
and the low tax management as condition 1. All other conditions are coded as 0. I find no 
support that CSR perceptions fall as a result of greater tax management in developed 
countries (p=0.1519). I repeat this analysis for the developing country condition. I again 
find no support that CSR perceptions fall when tax management increases in developing 
countries (p=0.1687). H4(a) is thereby not supported. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
I also predict that the negative impact of tax management on CSR perceptions will 
be lessened when a CSR disclosure is provided27. I again use ANCOVA as a preliminary 
test for this moderation. I find a significant interaction between the presence of a CSR 
disclosure and tax management (p=0.1832, two-tailed; p=0.0916, one-tailed). I again use 
contrast coding to supplement my ANCOVA. See Table 5, Panel C for the results of my 
contrast coding. My contrast codes are again derived from my hypothesis and applied 
across my disclosure conditions. While H5 predicts an interaction, equity theory would 
also point to a positive direct effect of CSR disclosure. When a CSR disclosure is present, 
it should increase the company’s perceived contributions to the exchange regardless of 
their level of tax management. Thus, I predict that CSR perceptions will be highest when 
companies engage in low levels of tax management when a CSR disclosure is present. I 
                                                             
27 I do not manipulate the extent of CSR disclosure. In my experiment, all participants receive a disclosure 
showing four CSR activities. I do not test whether different results would be found with more or fewer 
activities disclosed. 
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code my low tax management/CSR disclosure present condition as 1.5 accordingly. I do 
not predict a significant difference between my low tax management/CSR disclosure 
absent condition and my high tax management/CSR disclosure present condition because 
I predict the CSR disclosure will moderate the negative impact of the high tax 
management. Thereby I code both of these conditions slightly lower than my highest 
condition with a 1. Lastly, I predict that the lowest CSR perceptions will result from the 
high tax management/CSR disclosure absent condition. Thus, I code that condition as -
3.5 to represent the more negative impact of tax management when a CSR disclosure is 
not present to act as a reputational shield. See Figure 3 for my contrast codes. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Using my planned contrast weights for my cell means, my hypothesis test is 
significant (F=42.38, p<.0001). See Figure 4. Thus, I find support that the effect of tax 
management differs across CSR disclosure conditions. I thereby analyze the simple 
effects of tax management at each level of my disclosure condition. Specifically, I look 
to ascertain whether the impact of tax management is stronger in conditions in which a 
CSR disclosure is absent. To do this, I first examine whether greater tax management 
leads to lower CSR perceptions when a CSR disclosure is absent by coding the high tax 
management condition as -1 and the low tax management condition as 1. All other 
conditions are coded as 0. Using these simple effects tests, I find support for H5(a). I find 
that the negative impact of tax management on CSR perceptions is greater when a CSR 
disclosure is absent (p=0.0223) than when a CSR disclosure is present (p=0.5617). My 
predicted interaction from H5(a) is thereby supported. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
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5.3.2. Analysis of Consumer Behavior 
 Given the supported impact of corporate tax management on CSR perceptions, I 
next examine whether tax management meaningfully impacts consumer decisions (H2). 
To test this, I again use ANCOVA. I first examine consumer willingness-to-purchase. I 
expect to find a significantly negative direct effect of tax management on consumer 
willingness-to-purchase. See Table 6 for my results. I find an insignificant main effect of 
tax management on participants’ willingness-to-purchase (p=0.9567)28. Thus, consumers 
do not appear to change their purchasing decision based upon the company’s tax 
management.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
To assess whether my investing and non-investing consumer samples react 
similarly, I split my sample and repeat the above analysis on both samples separately. In 
untabulated results, I find that neither my investing consumers (p=0.5907) nor my non-
investing consumers (p=0.6747) change their willingness to purchase a product based 
upon the company’s tax management. 
I next examine whether the country’s level of development moderates the impact 
of tax management on consumers’ willingness-to-purchase (H4b). While corporate tax 
                                                             
28 In untabulated results, I include a dummy variable for my investor sample to determine if investors 
incorporate tax management into their purchasing decisions differently than consumers. I interact this 
dummy variable with my tax management variable (ETR), as well as the interactions with country 
development and CSR disclosure. All interactions with this dummy variable provide insignificant p-
values. Thus, I fail to find evidence that investors and consumers do not similarly incorporate corporate 
tax management into their purchasing decisions. 
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management alone does not appear to impact consumers’ decision, it may impact their 
decision when interacted with the country’s level of development. While my ANCOVA 
shows an insignificant interaction (p=0.5746), I rely on contrast coding to test my 
predicted ordinal interaction, using the same contrast codes as I use for H4a. See Table 
6, Panel C, as well as Figure 5. However, I again find no support that the impact of tax 
management differs across country conditions (p=0.8062). Thus, I conclude that 
consumers do not change their willingness-to-purchase regardless of the location of the 
corporation’s tax management. 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
I again split my sample and repeat the above analysis on both samples separately 
to assess whether my investing and non-investing consumer samples react similarly. In 
untabulated results, I find via ANCOVA that the interaction of tax management and 
country development does not significantly impact investing consumers’ willingness to 
purchase a product (p=0.4462). Using my predicted contrast codes on this sample, I again 
fail to find any support for the ability of country development to moderate the impact of 
tax management on investing consumers’ willingness to purchase a product (p=0.4650). 
Similarly, for non-investing consumers, I find no support through either ANCOVA 
(p=0.2597) or contrast coding (p=0.6103) that country development moderates the impact 
of tax management on willingness to purchase.  
 I also examine whether the presence of a CSR disclosure moderates the impact of 
tax management on consumers’ willingness-to-purchase (H5b). My ANCOVA again 
shows an insignificant interaction (p=0.4090). Turning again to contrast coding, I use the 
same contrast codes as I use for H5a. See Table 6, Panel C, as well as Figure 6. Here, I 
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find support that the impact of tax management differs across CSR Disclosure conditions 
(p=0.1146, two-tailed; p=0.0573, one-tailed). I thereby analyze the simple effects of tax 
management at each level of my disclosure condition. Specifically, I look to ascertain 
whether the impact of tax management is stronger in conditions in which a CSR 
disclosure is absent. To do this, I first examine whether greater tax management leads to 
lower purchase intentions when a CSR disclosure is absent by coding the high tax 
management condition as -1 and the low tax management condition as 1. All other 
conditions are coded as 0. Using these simple effects tests, I find no meaningful support 
for H5(b). When a CSR disclosure is absent, I find no support that purchase intentions 
fall when tax management increases (p=0.6503). I find similar results when a CSR 
disclosure is present (p=0.9541). Thus, I conclude that consumers do not significantly 
change their willingness-to-purchase based upon the company’s tax management 
regardless of the presence of a CSR disclosure. 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 I again split my sample and repeat the above analysis on both samples separately. 
In untabulated results, I find via ANCOVA that the interaction of tax management and 
CSR disclosure does not significantly impact investing consumers’ willingness to 
purchase a product (p=0.8364). Using my contrast codes on this sample, I again fail to 
find any support for the ability of CSR disclosure to moderate the impact of tax 
management on investing consumers’ willingness to purchase a product (p=0.8570). 
Similarly, for non-investing consumers, I find no support through either ANCOVA 
(p=0.2180) or contrast coding (p=0.2847) that CSR disclosure moderates the impact of 
tax management on willingness to purchase. 
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I next conduct similar tests for consumers’ willingness-to-pay for products. I 
predict that consumers will be less willing to pay for products produced by companies 
that manage their taxes downward. See Table 7 for results. I fail to find support for this 
prediction (p=0.2604).  
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
Again, I split my sample into investing and non-investing consumers and repeat 
the above analysis on both samples separately. I find that neither my investing consumers 
(p=0.6643) nor my non-investing consumers (p=0.2750) change their willingness-to-pay 
for a product based upon the company’s tax management. See Tables 8 and 9 for these 
results. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
I then examine whether the country’s level of development moderates the impact 
of corporate tax management on consumers’ willingness-to-pay (H4b). While my 
ANCOVA shows an insignificant interaction (p=0.2211), I rely on contrast coding to test 
my predicted ordinal interaction, again using the same predicted contrast codes that I use 
for H4a. See Table 7, Panel C, as well as Figure 7. However, I again find no support that 
this moderation exists (p=0.2879). Thus, I conclude that consumers do not change their 
willingness-to-pay based upon corporate tax management regardless of the country in 
which the tax management occurs. 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
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I again split my sample and repeat the above analysis on both samples separately. 
I find via ANCOVA that the interaction of tax management and country development 
does significantly impact investing consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a product 
(p=0.0759). See Table 8 for results. However, after using my contrast codes on this 
sample, I fail to find support for my predicted interaction (p=0.8570). For non-investing 
consumers, I find no support through either ANCOVA (p=0.6521) or contrast coding 
(p=0.1847) that country development moderates the impact of tax management on 
willingness to purchase. See Table 9 for results. 
 I further examine whether the presence of a CSR disclosure moderates the impact 
of corporate tax management on consumers’ willingness-to-pay (H5b). Here, my 
ANCOVA shows a significant interaction (p=0.1966, two-tailed; p=0.0983, one-tailed). 
However, after supplementing with contrast coding (using the same predicted codes I use 
for H5a), I fail to find support for my predicted interaction between CSR disclosure and 
tax management (p=0.3919). See Figure 8. Thus, I conclude that consumers do not change 
their willingness-to-pay in the direction predicted. However, as I find a significant two-
way interaction effect in my ANCOVA, as well as a significant three-way interaction 
effect (p=0.0194), I conclude that a disordinal interaction does exist. Thus, CSR 
disclosure can moderate the relation between tax management and willingness-to-pay 
conditional on the country’s level of development. Specifically, I find that CSR disclosure 
significantly moderates the impact of corporate tax management on CSR perceptions only 
when the tax management occurs in developed countries. This moderation is not present 
when the tax management occurs in developing countries.  
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
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After splitting my sample and repeating the above analysis on both investing and 
non-investing consumer samples separately, I find via ANCOVA that the interaction of 
tax management and CSR disclosure does not significantly impact investing consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay for a product (p=0.2790). See Table 8 for results. I again find no 
support for my predicted interaction using contrast coding (p=0.7071). For non-investing 
consumers, I also find no support through either ANCOVA (p=0.4230) or contrast coding 
(p=0.5139) that country development moderates the impact of tax management on 
willingness to purchase. See Table 9 for results. 
5.3.3. Analysis of Investor Behavior 
Given the supported impact of corporate tax management on CSR perceptions, I 
also examine whether corporate tax management meaningfully impacts investor decisions 
(H3). First, I expect to find a significantly negative direct effect of tax management on 
willingness to invest. See Table 10 for my results. Using ANCOVA, I find the impact of 
tax management on willingness to invest to be insignificant (p=0.4861). Thus, I fail to 
find support that investors would be less willing to invest in companies managing their 
taxes downward.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
I then examine whether the country’s level of development moderates the impact 
of tax management on investors’ willingness to invest (H4c). My ANCOVA shows a 
significant interaction (p=0.0511). However, after supplementing with contrast coding 
(using the same predicted codes I use for H4a), I fail to find support for my predicted 
interaction between country development and tax management (p=0.3306). See Figure 9. 
Thus, I conclude that investors do not change their willingness to invest in the direction 
63 
 
predicted. However, from my ANCOVA, I do find that investors are less willing to invest 
in firms engaging in greater levels tax management in developing countries relative to the 
industry average. In developed countries, investors appear to increase their willingness 
to invest when companies manage their taxes downward. This finding is consistent with 
investors viewing tax management as good business so long as they occur in developed 
countries. Thus, while I do not find support for my predicted interaction, I do find support 
for a different and perhaps more interesting interaction between tax management and 
economic development. To gain additional insight into my results, I analyze the simple 
main effect of tax management under the two country development conditions. This 
allows me to see if tax management has a meaningful effect in either country. In 
untabulated results, I find a significant negative impact of tax management on investors’ 
willingness to invest in still developing countries (p=0.0663). Therefore, I find support 
for a meaningful negative impact on willingness-to-invest of corporate tax management 
occurring in developing countries. However, I do not find support for a meaningful 
positive effect in developed countries29. Thus, although H4c is not supported, I find a 
meaningful interaction between tax management and country economic development. 
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
 I further examine whether the presence of a CSR disclosure moderates the impact 
of tax management on investors’ willingness to invest (H5c). Here, my ANCOVA shows 
                                                             
29 As this finding may be due to a lack of power because of my sample partitioning, I follow up with a 
regression analysis to increase my power (as suggested by Irwin and McClelland, 2001). However, I 
again find no significant impact of tax management on investors’ willingness to invest in developed 
countries. 
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an insignificant interaction (p=0.5821). After supplementing with contrast coding (using 
the same codes I use for H5a), I fail to find support for my predicted interaction between 
CSR disclosure and tax management (p=0.4626). See Figure 10. Thus, I conclude that the 
presence of a CSR disclosure does not significantly moderate the impact of corporate tax 
management on investors’ willingness to invest. 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
I next conduct a similar test for investors’ stock price valuations. I predict that 
participants will value the stock of a company managing their tax expense downward 
lower than stock of a company engaging in lesser amounts of tax management. See Table 
11 for results. I again find insignificant results (p=0.3395).  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
I then examine whether the country’s level of development moderates the impact 
of corporate tax management on investors’ stock price valuation (H4c). Here, I find a 
significant interaction (p=0.1406, two-tailed; p=0.0703, one-tailed). In developing 
countries, investors appear to lower their valuations of firms engaging in tax 
management. In developed countries, though, the means suggest that investors value such 
tax management and increase their stock price valuations. To gain additional insight into 
my results, I again analyze the simple main effect of tax management under the two 
country development conditions. However, in untabulated results, I fail to find a 
significant impact of corporate tax management on investors’ stock price valuations, 
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regardless of country30. Similarly, after supplementing with contrast coding (using the 
same predicted codes I use for H4a), I fail to find support for my predicted interaction 
between country development and tax management (p=0.3725). See Figure 11. Thus, I 
conclude that investors do not change their stock price valuations in the direction 
predicted. 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
 I further examine whether the presence of a CSR disclosure moderates the impact 
of corporate tax management on investors’ stock price valuations (H5c). My ANCOVA 
shows an insignificant interaction (p=0.6550). After supplementing with contrast coding 
(again using the same predicted codes I use in H5a), I fail to find support for my predicted 
interaction between CSR disclosure and tax management (p=0.7179). See Figure 12. 
Thus, I conclude that the impact of tax management on investors’ stock price valuations 
does not significantly change when a CSR disclosure is present.  
[Insert Figure 12 here] 
5.4 Supplemental Analyses 
 In my primary analyses, I include in my sample all participants who correctly 
answer two of my three manipulation check questions. However, it is possible that 
including participants missing even one of these questions may have negatively biased 
my analyses. I conduct supplemental analyses to examine the impact of these 
                                                             
30 As this finding may be due to a lack of power because of my sample partitioning, I again follow up 
with a regression analysis to increase my power. However, I again find no significant impact of tax 
management on investors’ stock price valuations, regardless of country development. 
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participants in my results. Thus, I replicate all of my primary analyses, including the 
failure of at least one manipulation check question as a moderating variable in my 
models. 
5.4.1 Supplemental Analysis of CSR Perceptions 
 Replicating my analysis of my first hypothesis, I again use ANCOVA to test my 
prediction. I create a dummy variable to indicate whether a manipulation check question 
was missed. Controlling for my two predicted moderators, I again find a significant main 
effect of tax management on CSR perceptions for participants accurately responding to 
all manipulation check questions (p=0.0769). As tax management increases, CSR 
perceptions significantly decrease overall. H1 is thereby still supported. I also find that, 
when participants miss a manipulation check, tax management does not significantly 
impact CSR perceptions (p=0.8529). See Table 12, Panel B for results of this ANCOVA.  
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 I further predict that the negative impact of corporate tax planning on CSR 
perceptions will be greater when the tax planning occurs in economically undeveloped 
countries (H4a). When participants miss no manipulation check questions, I find an 
insignificant interaction between the level of economic development and tax management 
when no CSR disclosure is provided (p=0.5398). This finding is consistent with the 
findings of my primary analysis. I again supplement my ANCOVA with contrast coding, 
using the same predicted codes that I use in my primary analysis. I code all conditions in 
which a manipulation check question is missed as 0. See Table 12, Panel C for the results 
of my contrast coding.  
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Using my planned contrast weights for my cell means, my hypothesis test is again 
significant (F=2.67, p=0.1033). Thus, I find support that the effect of tax management 
differs across country conditions for participants accurately answering all manipulation 
check questions. I again analyze the simple effects of tax management at each level of 
my country condition using the same contrast codes as used in my primary analysis. I 
again find support that CSR perceptions fall as a result of greater tax management in 
developed countries (p=0.0510). I repeat this analysis for the developing country 
condition. However, I do not find significant support that CSR perceptions fall when tax 
management increases in developing countries (p=0.7815). Thus, while I find support 
that the impact of tax management differs across country conditions, I do not find support 
that this impact is greater in developing countries as predicted. Rather, I find that the 
impact of tax management is greater in developed countries. Thus, I find no evidence that 
my inclusion of participants missing one manipulation check question significantly 
impacted my primary result. 
My ANCOVA shows a significant three-way interaction between tax 
management, country development, and my manipulation check question dummy 
variable (p=0.0412). Thus, I have statistical reason to further examine this interaction. I 
use the same contrast codes as used in my above analysis. For my primary contrast coding 
analysis, I find that, when a manipulation check question is missed, my predicted 
interaction between tax management and country development is not supported 
(p=0.3930, untabulated). Thus, while including participants missing a manipulation 
check question negatively biased my primary analyses, my primary findings regarding 
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the ability of the country’s economic development to moderate the impact of tax 
management on CSR perceptions are still supported. 
I also predict that the negative impact of tax management on CSR perceptions will 
be lessened when a CSR disclosure is provided. Using ANCOVA, when participants 
correctly answer all manipulation check questions, I find an insignificant interaction 
between the presence of a CSR disclosure and tax management (p=0.4648). I again use 
contrast coding to supplement my ANCOVA. See Table 12, Panel C for the results of my 
contrast coding. My contrast codes are identical to those used in my primary analyses. 
All conditions in which a manipulation check question is missed are coded as 0 so that 
my contrast test captures those participants accurately answering all manipulation check 
questions.  
Using my planned contrast weights for my cell means, my hypothesis test is 
again significant (F=33.55, p<.0001). Thus, for participants correctly answering all 
manipulation check questions, I again find support that the effect of tax management 
differs across CSR disclosure conditions. Analyzing the simple effects of tax 
management at each level of my disclosure condition, I again find support for H5(a). I 
find that CSR perceptions fall more when a CSR disclosure is absent (p=0.0478) than 
when a CSR disclosure is present (p=0.7588). As such, my primary findings regarding 
H5(a) are again supported. 
5.4.2 Supplemental Analysis of Consumer Behavior 
I next replicate my analyses for H2. Using ANCOVA, I first examine consumer 
willingness-to-purchase to examine whether my inclusion of participants missing a 
manipulation check question significantly impacted my primary results. See Table 13 for 
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my results. Consistent with my primary finding in Chapter 5.3, I find an insignificant 
main effect of tax management on participants’ willingness-to-purchase (p=0.5811). 
Thus, the inclusion of participants missing a manipulation check question does not 
significantly moderate my results. Consumers do not appear to change their purchasing 
decision based upon the company’s tax management.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
I next examine whether the number of manipulation check questions missed 
moderates the interaction between the country’s level of development and tax 
management on consumers’ willingness-to-purchase (H4b). While my ANCOVA shows 
an insignificant interaction (p=0.9621), I rely on contrast coding to test my predicted 
ordinal interaction, using the same contrast codes as I use for H4a. See Table 13, Panel 
C. Here, I find support that the impact of tax management differs across country 
conditions when participants correctly answer all manipulation check questions 
(p=0.1379, two-tailed; p=0.0690). However, after examining the simple effects split for 
country condition, I find no support that purchase intentions fall when tax management 
increases in developing countries, as predicted (p=0.9019). Thus, my results do not 
change when I exclude participants who do not correctly answer all manipulation check 
questions.  
 Next, I examine whether the presence of a CSR disclosure moderates the impact 
of tax management on consumers’ willingness-to-purchase (H5b) when I include 
attention check questions missed as a moderator. My ANCOVA again shows an 
insignificant interaction (p=0.3259). Turning again to contrast coding, I use the same 
contrast codes as I use for H5a. See Table 13, Panel C. Contrary to my primary result, I 
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find support through my contrast code test that the impact of tax management differs 
across CSR Disclosure conditions (p=0.0632). Thus, I follow up on this result with simple 
effects tests. While I find that CSR disclosure interacted with tax management does 
negatively impact purchasing decisions (p=0.0917), I do not find support that tax 
management reduces purchase intentions when a CSR disclosure is absent (p=0.7795). 
Thus, my prediction that a CSR disclosure will lessen the impact of tax management 
compared with the absence of a CSR disclosure is again not supported. 
I next repeat similar tests for my prediction that consumers will be less willing to 
pay for products produced by companies that manage their taxes downward. I again 
include manipulation check questions missed as a moderator. See Table 14 for results. I 
again fail to find support for this prediction (p=0.2251). Thus, my inclusion of 
participants missing a manipulation check question did not significantly impact my 
results. 
 [Insert Table 14 here] 
I then examine whether the country’s level of development moderates the impact 
of corporate tax management on consumers’ willingness-to-pay (H4b), including the 
manipulation check question dummy variable as an additional moderator. While my 
ANCOVA again shows an insignificant interaction (p=0.3749), I rely on contrast coding 
to test my predicted ordinal interaction, again using the same predicted contrast codes 
that I use for H4a. See Table 14, Panel C. However, I again find no support that this 
moderation exists (p=0.4337). Thus, I again find that consumers do not change their 
willingness-to-pay based upon corporate tax management regardless of the country in 
which the tax management occurs. 
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 I repeat my analysis of whether the presence of a CSR disclosure moderates the 
impact of corporate tax management on consumers’ willingness-to-pay (H5b), including 
my manipulation check variable as an additional moderator. Here, my ANCOVA shows 
a significant interaction (p=0.0135), similar to that found in my primary analysis. 
However, after supplementing with contrast coding (using the same predicted codes I 
use for H5a), I fail to find support for my predicted interaction between CSR disclosure 
and tax management (p=0.7861). Thus, I conclude that participants’ failure to answer 
all manipulation check questions correctly does not moderate the interaction between 
country development and tax management’s impact on consumer willingness-to-pay. 
5.4.2 Supplemental Analysis of Investor Behavior 
Lastly, I replicate my analyses of tax management’s influence on investor 
behavior. See Table 15 for my results. Using ANCOVA, I find the impact of tax 
management on willingness to invest to be insignificant (p=0.6260). This finding is 
consistent with the result from my primary analysis.   
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
I then replicate my examination of whether the country’s level of development 
moderates the impact of tax management on investors’ willingness to invest (H4c). 
Again, I include the manipulation check dummy variable as a moderator. My ANCOVA 
shows a significant interaction (p=0.1674, two-tailed; p=0.0837, one-tailed), consistent 
with my primary analysis. After supplementing with contrast coding (using the same 
codes I use for H4a), I find that my predicted relation is not supported (p=0.2642). Thus, 
similar to my findings in my primary analyses, my predicted relation is not supported. 
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 I further replicate my examination of whether the presence of a CSR disclosure 
moderates the impact of tax management on investors’ willingness to invest (H5c). 
Again, I include the manipulation check dummy variable as a moderator. Here, my 
ANCOVA shows an insignificant interaction (p=0.9082), consistent with my primary 
analysis. After supplementing with contrast coding (using the same codes I use for H5a), 
I again fail to find support for my predicted interaction between CSR disclosure and tax 
management (p=0.8056).  
I next repeat the test for investors’ stock price valuations. See Table 16 for results. 
I again find an insignificant result (p=0.3014).  
[Insert Table 16 here] 
In replicating my tests for H4(c) for stock price valuation, I find a significant 
interaction (p=0.2041, two-tailed; p=0.1020, one-tailed) between tax management and 
country development. However, after supplementing with contrast coding, I fail to find 
support for my predicted interaction (p=0.4869). Thus, tax management does not appear 
to impact investors’ stock price valuations more when conducted in developing countries 
than developed countries. I find no evidence that this result is moderated by participants 
missing a manipulation check question.  
 In replicating my tests for H5(c) for stock price valuation, I find an insignificant 
interaction (p=0.5995) between tax management and CSR disclosure, consistent with 
my primary results. I again find no evidence that this result is moderated by participants 
missing a manipulation check question. After supplementing with contrast coding 
(again using the same predicted codes I use in H5a), I again fail to find support for my 
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predicted interaction between CSR disclosure and tax management (p=0.5803). Thus, I 
conclude that the impact of tax management on investors’ stock price valuations does 
not significantly change when a CSR disclosure is present. 
 Overall, the results of my supplemental analysis provide support of the validity 
of my primary results. I find no support that participants’ failure to answer all 
manipulation check questions correctly significantly biased the results of any of my 
hypothesis tests.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation, I examine the impact of corporate tax management on CSR 
perceptions. Consistent with Davis et al. (2017), I find support that investors perceive 
firms engaging in higher levels of tax management to be more socially irresponsible than 
firms engaging in lower levels of tax management. Individuals appear to alter their 
perceptions of firm CSR for corporate tax management without being prompted towards 
such an alteration. My results are also consistent with Rego et al.’s (2017) findings of 
reputational damage arising from tax management. I then extend the work of Davis et al. 
(2017) and Rego et al. (2017) by finding support that this relation is moderated by the 
presence of a firm-issued voluntary CSR disclosure.  
As a follow-up, I examine whether this relation impacts consumer and investor 
decisions in a meaningful way. Interestingly, though, my study finds that these altered 
CSR perceptions do not lead to as great a change in behavior as may have been supposed. 
I find no support that a firm’s tax management impacts consumer decisions regarding 
their willingness-to-purchase or willingness-to-pay. This finding is contrary to the results 
of Hardeck and Hertl’s (2014) study, suggesting that media framing may play an 
important role in consumer reactions to corporate tax management. I also find little 
support that investors are willing to change their investment behaviors (either 
willingness-to-invest or stock price valuation) for firm tax management. The only 
exception I find to this is that investors appear less willing to invest in companies 
managing their tax expense downward in developing countries. My results are contrary 
to the results found by Davis et al. (2017) regarding investor behaviors. Davis et al. (2017) 
find support that investors, proxied for by MBA students, are willing to pay a price 
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premium for the stock of socially responsible companies that manage their tax expense 
downward. However, I fail to find support that investors change their firm valuations 
regardless of tax management or additional CSR information.  
My findings should be considered in light of certain limitations. In my study, 
select information was provided about the target firm to allow the study to be completed 
in a reasonable amount of time. Investors would have access to a much larger quantity of 
information outside of my study. Future research could expand the information set 
provided in the study to determine if a greater amount of information or a different 
selection of information meaningfully changes investors’ decisions. Also, I manipulated 
the target company’s tax management at two set levels. However, it is possible that 
different changes in my tax management proxy (ETR) could also impact consumer and 
investor behaviors. Future research could explore the impact of varying levels of changes 
in tax management on decision making. I also did not manipulate the tax strategies used 
by the target company to manage its tax expense downward. Rather, I focused solely on 
consumer/investor reactions to the tax management. Future studies can examine whether 
the different strategies used to manage tax expense impact decision making differently. 
Lastly, I used a corporate-issued CSR disclosure in my instrument. Although the results 
for the relation between CSR and tax management are consistent with those found by 
Davis et al. (2017) using a third-party CSR rating, it is still possible that people perceive 
these corporate-issued disclosures differently than they perceive the CSR rating. Future 
research can investigate how trustworthy individuals perceive voluntary CSR disclosures 
and whether or not those disclosures have an impact on behavior similar to that of third-
party CSR ratings. 
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Despite these limitations, my findings meaningfully contribute to the emerging 
literature tying taxes to CSR perceptions. I find significant support that corporate tax 
management does indeed impact CSR perceptions. My study also is the first to examine 
the impact of international tax management on CSR perceptions. I find significant support 
that the economic development of the country in which the tax management occurs 
impacts the influence of the tax management on investor decisions. When the tax 
management occurs in less developed countries, investors are less willing to invest than 
when the tax management occurs in more developed countries. This is especially 
important given the potential for public country-by-country tax expense reporting in the 
future. Should public country-by-country tax expense reporting become mandatory, firms 
may be able to minimize their tax risk by paying higher tax expense in these lesser 
developed countries. Also, my findings regarding investor behavior resulting from 
corporate tax management differ from those found by Davis et al. (2017). Thus, I provide 
some support that the differences between our studies may be important for tax and CSR 
constructs. First, MBA students may not be an appropriate proxy for investors for 
ethically-charged constructs such as tax management and CSR. Alternatively, investors 
may not rely upon voluntary firm-issued CSR disclosures as heavily as third-party issued 
CSR ratings. 
My study is also the first to examine the ability of company-issued CSR 
disclosures to act as reputational safeguards for corporate tax management. I find support 
that company-issued CSR disclosures do have the ability to act as a reputational safeguard 
against tax management. Thus, I build on and extend the findings of Zahller et al. (2015) 
regarding the ability of CSR disclosures to protect the firm from exogenous shocks. When 
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companies issue voluntary CSR disclosures, CSR perceptions are impacted less by 
corporate tax management. This finding is especially important for companies looking to 
reduce their tax risk. As CSR disclosures are not yet regulated, issuing such a disclosure 
may be a cost-effective way to protect the firm’s reputation from potential leaks of 
corporate tax strategies.  
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TABLE 1 
                                Overall Demographic Profile  
              
Sample (n=447)       Number of Respondents 
Age         n % 
  21-29       84 18.79% 
  30-39       137 30.65% 
  40-49       81 18.12% 
  50-59       62 13.87% 
  60-69       64 14.32% 
  >69       19 4.25% 
Gender             
  Female       218 48.77% 
  Male       229 51.23% 
Income             
  <$25,000       58 12.98% 
  $25,001 - $45,000     79 17.67% 
  $45,001 - $75,000     122 27.29% 
  $75,001-$120,000     107 23.94% 
  <$120,000       81 18.12% 
              
              
Education             
  High School     48 10.74% 
  Some College     53 11.86% 
  Associate's Degree     39 8.72% 
  Bachelor's Degree     178 39.82% 
  
Some Graduate 
School     22 4.92% 
  Graduate Degree     107 23.94% 
              
College Major           
  Business       93 26.88% 
  Liberal Arts     67 19.36% 
  Science/Engineering     82 23.70% 
  Social Science     42 12.14% 
  Other       62 17.92% 
              
Experience Analyzing Financial 
Statements       
  Never       172 38.48% 
  1 Time       56 12.53% 
  2 Times       120 26.85% 
  3 Times       44 9.84% 
  4 Times       55 12.30% 
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TABLE 2 
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TABLE 3 
Cell Means 
            
  15% ETR 25% ETR 
Developed 
Country / 
CSR Report 
Absent 
          
n: 61   n: 60 
Age: 43.1   Age: 41 
Experience: 2-4 times   Experience: 2-4 times 
Education: Bachelor's Degree   Education: Bachelor's Degree 
Male: 46%   Male: 58% 
Income $75,378    Income $77,914  
          
Developing 
Country / 
CSR Report 
Absent 
          
n: 60   n: 55 
Age: 46.1   Age: 46.3 
Experience: Once   Experience: Once 
Education: Bachelor's Degree   Education: Bachelor's Degree 
Male: 50%   Male: 49% 
Income $91,186    Income $87,319  
          
Developed 
Country / 
CSR Report 
Present 
          
n: 54   n: 52 
Age: 40.2   Age: 40 
Experience: Once   Experience: Once 
Education: Bachelor's Degree   Education: Bachelor's Degree 
Male: 52%   Male: 50% 
Income $82,654    Income $77,001  
          
Developing 
Country / 
CSR Report 
Present 
          
n: 58   n: 45 
Age: 41.1   Age: 49.5 
Experience: 2-4 times   Experience: Once 
Education: Bachelor's Degree   Education: Bachelor's Degree 
Male: 53%   Male: 53% 
Income $80,422    Income $61,363  
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TABLE 4 
Correlation Matrix 
            
Variable Age Experience Education Gender Income 
Age 1         
Experience 0.0437 1       
Education 0.0137 0.2963 1     
Gender -0.0920 -0.3589 -0.2316 1   
Income 0.0148 0.2024 0.3241 -0.1017 1 
            
            
            
The table finds the correlation between the control variables using the sample of 447 
observations. Pearson correlations are reported. All correlations are significant at least 
at the 10% level except the correlations in bold. See below for variable definitions. 
            
Variable Definitions:         
Age = Age of participant as measured in years. 
Experience = Number of times the participant has personally analyzed financial 
statements for investment purposes. 
Education = The highest level of education the participant has achieved 
academically (e.g. High School, Bachelor's Degree, Graduate 
Degree). 
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for CSR Perceptions                
Hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
         
CSR Perceptions when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 55 4.7348 1.0713   60 5.0887 0.8771 
                
High Tax Management 60 4.6021 1.0826   61 4.5402 1.1406 
                
CSR Perceptions when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.   n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 45 5.5349 1.2100   52 5.5756 1.0172 
                
High Tax Management 58 5.3081 1.3624   54 5.6848 1.0220 
                
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for CSR Perceptions 
Source of Variation SS df MS  F-Stat p-value 
Corrected Model 83.8235 9 9.3137   7.65 <.001 
Tax Management 4.4028 1 4.4028   3.62 0.0579 
Economic Development 3.3859 1 3.3859   2.78 0.0961 
CSR Report  67.9461 1 67.9461   55.81 <.001 
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. 0.0436 1 0.0436   0.04 0.8501 
Tax Man. x CSR Report 2.163 1 2.163   1.78 0.1832 
Econ. Dev. x CSR Report 0.1080 1 0.1080   0.09 0.7659 
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. x 
CSR Report 3.8967 1 3.8967   3.20 0.7430 
Education 0.9079 1 0.9079   0.78 0.3883 
Age 2.4089 1 2.4089   1.98 0.1602 
Error 531.9847 437 1.2174       
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts 
  
  
        
  
H4 Hypothesized Contrasts 
 
df   F-Value  p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, CSR 
Perceptions are highest in 
developed/developing countries with 
low tax management, lower in 
developed countries with high tax 
management, and lowest in 
developing countries with high tax 
management (contrast weights: 1.5, 
1.5, -1, -2) 
1 
    
4.78 
  
0.0292 
      
      
      
Simple Effects               
CSR perceptions fall as a result of 
greater tax management in 
developing countries (contrast 
weights: -1, 1)  
1     1.90   0.1687 
CSR perceptions fall as a result of 
greater tax management in 
developed countries (contrast 
weights: -1, 1) 
  
1     2.06   0.1519 
H5 Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H5: Across disclosure conditions, 
CSR Perceptions are highest when 
CSR Report is present and tax 
management is low, lower when 
CSR Report is present and tax 
management is high and when CSR 
Report is absent and tax 
management is low, and lowest 
when CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is high (contrast 
weights: 1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
42.38 
  
<.0001 
      
      
      
      
Simple Effects               
When a CSR disclosure is 
present, CSR perceptions fall 
when tax management increases 
(contrast weights: 1, -1) 
  
1     0.34   0.5617 
When a CSR disclosure is absent, 
CSR perceptions fall when tax 
management increases (contrast 
weights: 1, -1) 
  
1     5.26   0.0223 
                
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Purchasing Intentions           
Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Purchasing Intentions when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 55 65.0881 22.6791   60 66.9456 21.0080 
                
High Tax Management 60 62.7679 21.8729   61 65.4643 23.7603 
                
Purchasing Intentions when CSR Disclosure is Provided  
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.   n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 45 67.0277 22.7229   52 70.8633 19.8430 
                
High Tax Management 58 71.5325 26.3111   54 69.6943 24.1214 
                
                
                
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Purchasing Intentions 
Source of Variation SS df MS  F-Stat p-value  
Corrected Model 11072.7996 9 1230.3111   2.45 0.0101   
Tax Management 1.4832 1 1.4832   0.00 0.9567   
Economic Development 286.5147 1 286.5147   0.57 0.4509   
CSR Report  2427.8028 1 2427.8028   4.82 0.0286   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 158.81 1 158.81   0.32 0.5746   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 343.7225 1 343.7225   0.68 0.4090   
Econ Dev. x CSR Report 44.6554 1 44.6554   0.09 0.7659   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 289.3191 1 289.3191   0.57 0.4487   
Investor Sample 810.9325 1 810.9325   1.61 0.2050   
Age 7390.2639 1 7390.2639   14.69 <.0001   
Error 217378.9289 432 503.1920         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, purchase 
intentions are highest in 
developed/developing countries with low 
tax management, lower in developed 
countries with high tax management, and 
lowest in developing countries with high 
tax management (contrast weights: 1.5, 
1.5, -1, -2) 
1 
    
0.06 
  
0.8062 
      
      
      
H5: Across disclosure conditions, purchase 
intentions are highest when CSR Report is 
present and tax management is low, lower 
when CSR Report is present and tax 
management is high and when CSR Report 
is absent and tax management is low, and 
lowest when CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is high (contrast weights: 1.5, 
1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
2.50 
  
0.1146       
      
      
      
Simple Effects        
When a CSR disclosure is present,  
Purchase intentions fall when tax  
management increases (contrast  
weights: 1, -1) 
 
1   0.00  0.9541 
When a CSR disclosure is absent, 
Purchase intentions fall when tax 
management increases (contrast 
weights: 1, -1). 
 
1   0.21  0.6503 
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 7 
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Willingness to Pay               
Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Willingness to Pay when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.   n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 55 83.3977 22.9293   60 86.5166 22.0780 
                
High Tax Management 60 85.4350 21.8186   61 83.7344 21.6911 
                
Willingness to Pay when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 45 90.5857 23.5136   52 79.5392 22.6010 
                
High Tax Management 58 88.1121 26.4567   54 92.4537 21.1594 
                
                
                
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Willingness to Pay 
Source of Variation SS df MS  F-Stat p-value  
Corrected Model 11222.3624 9 1246.9292   2.44 0.0102   
Tax Management 648.5491 1 648.5491   1.27 0.2604   
Economic Development 188.4675 1 188.4675   0.37 0.5438   
CSR Report  929.812 1 929.812   1.82 0.1779   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 766.7053 1 766.7053   1.50 0.2211   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 854.0310 1 854.0310   1.67 0.1966   
Econ Dev. x CSR Report 455.6109 1 455.6109   0.89 0.3454   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 2813.6334 1 2813.6334   5.51 0.0194   
Investor Sample 4136.8311 1 4136.8311   8.00 0.0046   
Age 0.8024 1 0.8024   0.00 0.9684   
Error 223163.1141 437 510.6707         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, 
willingness to pay is highest in 
developed/developing countries with low 
tax management, lower in developed 
countries with high tax management, and 
lowest in developing countries with high 
tax management (contrast weights: 1.5, 
1.5, -1, -2) 
1 
    
1.13 
  
0.2879 
      
      
      
H5: Across disclosure conditions, 
willingness to pay is highest when CSR 
Report is present and tax management is 
low, lower when CSR Report is present 
and tax management is high and when 
CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is low, and lowest when 
CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is high (contrast weights: 
1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
0.73 
  
0.3919             
      
      
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Investing Consumers' Willingness to Pay     
Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Willingness to Pay when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided  
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 26 87.6356 17.2217   31 93.0767 12.4220 
                
High Tax Management 26 89.3980 21.8186   27 87.6772 22.5081 
                
Willingness to Pay when CSR Disclosure is Provided  
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 20 96.2189 18.7184   19 78.5389 26.5060 
                
High Tax Management 30 87.0299 20.9977   27 96.1463 18.8462 
                
                
                
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Willingness to Pay 
Source of Variation SS df MS  
F-
Stat 
p-
value  
Corrected Model 5481.0306 8 685.1288   1.81 0.0775  
Tax Management 71.6119 1 71.6119   0.19 0.6643  
Economic Development 72.9473 1 72.9473   0.19 0.6613  
CSR Report  0.0673 1 0.0673   0.00 0.9894  
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 1206.5334 1 1206.533   3.18 0.0759  
Tax Man. x CSR Report 446.6795 1 446.6795   1.18 0.2790  
Econ Dev. x CSR Report 472.2214 1 472.2214   1.25 0.2657  
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 3582.2349 1 3582.2349   9.45 0.0024  
Age 409.3396 1 409.3396   1.08 0.2999   
Error 74659.9063 197 378.9843         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts 
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, 
willingness to pay is highest in 
developed/developing countries with low 
tax management, lower in developed 
countries with high tax management, and 
lowest in developing countries with high 
tax management (contrast weights: 1.5, 
1.5, -1, -2) 
1 
    
0.03 
  
0.8570 
      
      
      
H5: Across disclosure conditions, 
willingness to pay is highest when CSR 
Report is present and tax management is 
low, lower when CSR Report is present 
and tax management is high and when 
CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is low, and lowest when 
CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is high (contrast weights: 
1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
0.14 
  
0.7071             
      
      
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 9 
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Non-Investing Consumers' Willingness to Pay     
Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Willingness to Pay when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 32 80.6872 26.2663   29 80.2927 27.3480 
                
High Tax Management 35 82.4205 24.3182   34 80.4222 20.7921 
                
Willingness to Pay when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 30 87.6003 26.0005   33 79.3058 26.8380 
                
High Tax Management 28 89.9481 24.5141   27 89.0667 22.9874 
                
                
                
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Willingness to Pay 
Source of Variation SS df MS  
F-
Stat 
p-
value  
Corrected Model 4081.6478 8 510.2060   0.82 0.5882   
Tax Management 747.6089 1 747.6089   1.20 0.2750   
Economic Development 497.7244 1 497.7244   0.80 0.3729   
CSR Report  1869.2021 1 1869.202   2.99 0.0849   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 127.235 1 127.235   0.20 0.6521   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 402.3481 1 402.3481   0.64 0.4230   
Econ Dev. x CSR Report 176.8994 1 176.8994   0.28 0.5951   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 312.3581 1 312.3581   0.50 0.4801   
Age 64.1011 1 64.1011   0.10 0.7490   
Error 149255.9489 239 624.5019         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, 
willingness to pay is highest in 
developed/developing countries with low 
tax management, lower in developed 
countries with high tax management, and 
lowest in developing countries with high 
tax management (contrast weights: 1.5, 
1.5, -1, -2) 
1 
    
1.77 
  
0.1847 
      
      
      
H5: Across disclosure conditions, 
willingness to pay is highest when CSR 
Report is present and tax management is 
low, lower when CSR Report is present 
and tax management is high and when 
CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is low, and lowest when 
CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is high (contrast weights: 
1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
0.43 
  
0.5139             
      
      
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 10 
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Investing Intentions             
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Investing Intentions when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.   n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 26 59.9779 24.1615   31 59.8339 21.9671 
                
High Tax Management 26 55.9199 21.0854   27 62.9834 22.9019 
                
Investing Intentions when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 20 71.4135 17.2212   19 56.3990 23.3201 
                
High Tax Management 30 58.3678 27.0068   27 61.3840 24.2685 
                
                
                
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Investing Intentions 
Source of Variation SS df MS  F-Stat p-value  
Corrected Model 5019.5552 8 627.4444   1.21 0.2933   
Tax Management 251.9976 1 251.9976   0.49 0.4861   
Economic Development 80.2153 1 80.2153   0.16 0.6942   
CSR Report  245.1047 1 245.1047   0.47 0.4921   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 1993.5022 1 1993.502   3.85 0.0511   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 157.2177 1 157.2177   0.30 0.5821   
Econ Dev. x CSR Report 1119.9622 1 1119.9622   2.16 0.1428   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x CSR Report 363.8887 1 363.8872   0.70 0.4027   
Age 1543.5095 1 1543.5095   2.98 0.0857   
Error 101936.9933 197 517.4467         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, investing 
intentions are highest when 
CSR Report is present and tax  
management is low and when CSR  
Report is absent and tax management 
 is low, lower when CSR Report 
 is present and tax management is high,  
and lowest when CSR Report is absent 
 and tax management is high (contrast 
weights: 1.5, 1.5, -1, -2).  
1   0.95  0.3306 
H5: Across disclosure conditions, 
investing intentions are highest when CSR 
Report is present and tax management is 
low, lower when CSR Report is present 
and tax management is high and when 
CSR Report is absent and tax management 
is low, and lowest when CSR Report is 
absent and tax management is high 
(contrast weights: 1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
0.54 
  
0.4626       
      
      
      
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 11 
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Valuation of Stock              
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Stock Valuation when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 26 40.6591 9.5718   31 38.0253 12.1797 
                
High Tax Management 26 40.5201 12.8345   27 39.6986 9.6628 
                
Stock Valuation when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 20 41.4472 8.3746   19 36.3080 7.9348 
                
High Tax Management 30 39.9995 14.0192   27 42.0333 10.3267 
                
                
                
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Stock Valuation 
Source of Variation SS df MS  
F-
Stat 
p-
value  
Corrected Model 658.4527 8 82.3066   0.71 0.6799   
Tax Management 105.8330 1 105.8330   0.92 0.3395   
Economic Development 133.8769 1 133.8769   1.16 0.2828   
CSR Report  2.4477 1 2.4477   0.02 0.8844   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 252.6352 1 252.6352   2.19 0.1406   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 23.1194 1 23.1194   0.20 0.6550   
Econ Dev. x CSR Report 0.3842 1 0.3842   0.00 0.9541   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 89.2873 1 89.2873   0.77 0.3802   
Age 95.9608 1 95.9608   0.83 0.3630   
Error 22741.5133 197 115.4392         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions,  
investing intentions are highest when 
CSR Report is present and tax  
management is low and when CSR  
Report is absent and tax management 
 is low, lower when CSR Report 
 is present and tax management is high,  
and lowest when CSR Report is absent 
 and tax management is high (contrast 
weights: 1.5, 1.5, -1, -2).  
1   0.80  0.3725 
H5: Across disclosure conditions, stock price 
valuation is highest when CSR Report is 
present and tax management is low, lower 
when CSR Report is present and tax 
management is high and when CSR Report is 
absent and tax management is low, and lowest 
when CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is high (contrast weights: 1.5, 1, 
1, -3.5) 
1 
    
0.13 
  
0.7179       
      
      
      
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 12 
Supplemental Analyses                                                   
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for CSR Perceptions                
Hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
CSR Perceptions when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  N 
LS 
Mean S.D.   n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 35 4.6270 1.0578   49 5.0995 0.8548 
                
High Tax Management 43 4.5733 0.9014   46 4.4472 1.1599 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  N 
LS 
Mean S.D. n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 20 4.9112 1.0923   11 5.0499 1.0124 
                
High Tax Management 17 4.6663 1.4572   15 4.8224 1.0710 
                
CSR Perceptions when CSR Disclosure is Provided  
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 32 5.3557 1.2061   31 5.7056 0.9070 
                
High Tax Management 43 5.3758 1.2561   38 5.6459 1.0569 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.   n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 13 5.9678 1.1719   21 5.3838 1.1555 
                
High Tax Management 15 5.1239 1.6688   16 5.7799 0.9638 
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Panel B: ANCOVA Results for CSR Perceptions 
Source of Variation SS df MS  
F-
Stat 
p-
value  
Corrected Model 92.2461 17 5.4262   4.45 <.001   
Tax Management 33861.0000 1 3.3861   3.14 0.0769   
Economic Development 2.3866 1 2.3866   1.96 0.1627   
CSR Report  52.1423 1 52.1423   42.72 <.001   
Attention Check 0.9925 1 0.9925   0.81 0.3677   
Tax Man. x Att. Check 0.042 1 0.042   0.03 0.8529   
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. 0.4596 1 0.4596   0.38 0.5398   
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. x Att. 
Check 5.1176 1 5.1176   4.19 0.0412   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 0.6533 1 0.6533   0.54 0.4648   
Tax Man. x CSR Report x 
Att. Check 0.5689 1 0.5689   0.47 0.4951   
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. x 
CSR Report 0.3411 1 0.3411   0.28 0.5973   
Tax Man. x Ec. Dev. x CSR x 
Att. Check 0.6815 1 0.6815   0.56 0.4553   
Education 1.1291 1 1.1291   0.93 0.3367   
Age 2.6364 1 2.6364   2.16 0.1424   
Error 523.5621 429 1.2204         
* Interactions not of interest have been omitted from the above 
table         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
H4 Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, when all 
manipulation check questions are answered 
correctly, CSR Perceptions are highest in 
developed/developing countries with low 
tax management, lower in developed 
countries with high tax management, and 
lowest in developing countries with high tax 
management (contrast weights: 1.5, 1.5, -1, 
-2) 
1 
    
2.67 
  
0.1033 
      
      
      
Simple Effects               
CSR perceptions fall as a result 
of greater tax management in 
developing countries (contrast 
weights: -1, 1) 
 
1     0.08   0.7815 
CSR perceptions fall as a result 
of greater tax management in 
developed countries (contrast 
weights: -1, 1) 
  
1     3.83   0.0510 
H5 Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H5: Across disclosure conditions, when all 
manipulation check questions are answered 
correctly, CSR Perceptions are highest 
when CSR Report is present and tax 
management is low, lower when CSR 
Report is present and tax management is 
high and when CSR Report is absent and 
tax management is low, and lowest when 
CSR Report is absent and tax management 
is high (contrast weights: 1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
33.55 
  
<.0001 
      
Simple Effects               
When a CSR disclosure is 
present, CSR perceptions fall 
when tax management increases 
(contrast weights: 1, -1) 
  
1     0.09   0.7588 
When a CSR disclosure is 
absent, CSR perceptions fall 
when tax management increases 
(contrast weights: 1, -1) 
  
1     3.94   0.0478 
                
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 13 
Supplemental Analyses                                                   
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Purchasing Intentions           
Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Purchasing Intentions when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 35 63.8967 23.5861   49 69.458 21.1120 
                
High Tax Management 43 62.0813 20.3692   46 68.2393 23.4243 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 20 67.3537 21.4790   11 55.3953 20.6850 
                
High Tax Management 17 64.7644 23.0983   15 56.9038 23.1183 
                
CSR Perceptions when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 32 67.9127 22.9259   31 81.0638 29.0980 
                
High Tax Management 43 71.1278 21.3507   38 68.2946 26.0072 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 13 65.6289 17.6569   21 55.4378 21.3510 
                
High Tax Management 15 72.4737 15.0620   16 72.6721 19.5967 
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Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Purchasing Intentions 
Source of Variation SS df MS  
F-
Stat 
p-
value  
Corrected Model 22920.1437 17 1348.2437   2.78 0.0002   
Tax Management 147.7921 1 147.7921   0.30 0.5811   
Economic Development 80.1618 1 80.1618   0.17 0.6845   
CSR Report  2953.3714 1 2953.3714   6.09 0.014   
Attention Check 2245.9868 1 2245.9868   4.63 0.0319   
Tax Man. x Att. Check 1720.3855 1 1720.3855   3.55 0.0603   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 1.0943 1 1.0943   0.00 0.9621   
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. x 
Att. Check 1211.4776 1 1211.4776   2.50 0.1146   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 468.9544 1 468.9544   0.97 0.3259   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 
x Att. Check 1368.6461 1 1368.6461   2.82 0.0935   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 144.5942 1 144.5942   0.30 0.5852   
Tax Man. x Ec. Dev. x 
CSR x Att. Check 709.9036 1 709.9036   1.46 0.2269   
Investor Sample 979.8618 1 979.8618   2.02 0.1558   
Age 5308.8977 1 5308.8977   10.95 0.0010   
Error 205531.5848 424 484.7443         
* Interactions not of interest have been omitted from the above 
table         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, when all 
manipulation check questions are 
answered correctly, purchase intentions 
are highest in developed/developing 
countries with low tax management, 
lower in developed countries with high 
tax management, and lowest in 
developing countries with high tax 
management (contrast weights: 1.5, 1.5, -
1, -2) 
1 
    
2.21 
  
0.1379 
      
      
      
Simple Effects       
In Developed countries, purchase 
intentions fall when tax management 
increases (contrast weights: 1, -1). 
1   3.76  0.0530 
In Developing countries, purchase 
intentions fall when tax management 
increases (contrast weights: 1, -1).  
1   0.02  0.9019 
H5: Across disclosure conditions, when 
all manipulation check questions are 
answered correctly, purchase intentions 
are highest when CSR Report is present 
and tax management is low, lower when 
CSR Report is present and tax 
management is high and when CSR 
Report is absent and tax management is 
low, and lowest when CSR Report is 
absent and tax management is high 
(contrast weights: 1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
3.47 
  
0.0632 
      
      
      
      
Simple Effects               
When a CSR disclosure is 
present, purchase intentions fall 
when tax management increases 
(contrast weights: 1, -1) 
  
1     2.86   0.0917 
When a CSR disclosure is absent 
purchase intentions fall when tax 
management increases (contrast 
weights: 1, -1) 
  
1     0.08   0.7795 
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 14 
Supplemental Analyses                                                   
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Willingness to Pay              
Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Willingness to Pay when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 35 77.7872 21.5492   49 86.5287 19.8210 
                
High Tax Management 43 87.2397 18.9396   46 85.9850 17.5499 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 20 92.7144 22.2829   11 86.3269 26.8090 
                
High Tax Management 17 81.1548 32.9609   15 76.8812 30.8820 
                
Willingness to Pay when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n LS Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 32 91.0799 26.2657   31 83.4348 23.2170 
                
High Tax Management 43 83.0577 24.4062   38 90.6367 20.9483 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n LS Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 13 89.3209 15.6357   21 73.9630 15.6590 
                
High Tax Management 15 102.5027 28.8234   16 96.7300 21.8387 
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Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Willingness to Pay 
Source of Variation SS df MS  
F-
Stat 
p-
value  
Corrected Model 21288.5286 17 1252.2664   2.52 0.0008   
Tax Management 733.0975 1 733.0975   1.48 0.2251   
Economic Development 799.4480 1 799.4480   1.61 0.2053   
CSR Report  1803.0101 1 18030101   3.63 0.0574   
Attention Check 252.9087 1 252.9087   0.51 0.4759   
Tax Man. x Att. Check 64.6481 1 64.6481   0.13 0.7185   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 391.8628 1 391.8628   0.79 0.3749   
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. x 
Att. Check 57.5378 1 57.5378   0.12 0.7338   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 3053.3215 1 3053.3215   6.15 0.0135   
Tax Man. x CSR Report x 
Att. Check 6143.0173 1 6143.0173   12.37 0.0005   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 1478.4589 1 1478.4589   2.98 0.0852   
Tax Man. x Ec. Dev. x 
CSR x Att. Check 433.2256 1 433.2256   0.87 0.3509   
Investor Sample 4857.6268 1 4857.6268   9.78 0.0019   
Age 0.0780 1 0.0780   0.00 0.9900   
Error 213096.9480 429 496.7295         
* Interactions not of interest have been omitted from the above 
table         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   Df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, when all 
manipulation check questions are 
answered correctly, willingness to pay is 
highest in developed/developing 
countries with low tax management, 
lower in developed countries with high 
tax management, and lowest in 
developing countries with high tax 
management (contrast weights: 1.5, 1.5, -
1, -2) 
1 
    
0.61 
  
0.4337 
      
      
      
H5: Across disclosure conditions, when 
all manipulation check questions are 
answered correctly, willingness to pay is 
highest when CSR Report is present and 
tax management is low, lower when CSR 
Report is present and tax management is 
high and when CSR Report is absent and 
tax management is low, and lowest when 
CSR Report is absent and tax 
management is high (contrast weights: 
1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
0.07 
  
0.7861 
      
      
      
      
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 15 
Supplemental Analyses                                                   
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Willingness to Invest            
Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Willingness to Invest when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n LS Mean S.D.  n LS Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 15 63.1370 23.9161   26 62.2433 21.5700 
                
High Tax Management 19 57.3532 21.1025   21 68.4993 14.3926 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n LS Mean S.D.  n LS Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 11 55.4318 25.0331   5 47.1737 16.3490 
                
High Tax Management 7 52.8010 25.5650   6 43.6968 36.6606 
                
Willingness to Invest when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 13 71.0046 18.4443   12 62.6641 23.1220 
                
High Tax Management 27 57.4369 24.0656   20 63.1258 26.3990 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 7 72.6572 15.7208   7 45.5572 31.9840 
                
High Tax Management 3 66.1932 15.1767   7 55.9419 18.0449 
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Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Willingness to Invest 
Source of Variation SS df MS  
F-
Stat 
p-
value   
Corrected Model 11039.2602 16 689.9538   1.36 0.1659   
Tax Management 120.9626 1 120.9626   0.24 0.6260   
Economic Development 1208.3000 1 1208.3000   2.38 0.1245   
CSR Report  1076.8817 1 1076.8817   2.12 0.1469   
Attention Check 2338.7617 1 2338.7617   4.61 0.0331   
Tax Man. x Att. Check 59.9363 1 59.9363   0.12 0.7315   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 974.9275 1 974.9275   1.92 0.1674   
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. x 
Att. Check 55.8147 1 55.8147   0.11 0.7405   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 6.7613 1 6.7613   0.01 0.9082   
Tax Man. x CSR Report x 
Att. Check 306.2546 1 306.2546   0.60 0.4382   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 213.0563 1 213.0563   0.42 0.5178   
Tax Man. x Ec. Dev. x CSR 
x Att. Check 135.3970 1 135.3970   0.27 0.6061   
Age 2155.4785 1 2155.4785   4.25 0.0407   
Error 95917.2884 189 507.4989         
* Interactions not of interest have been omitted from the above 
table         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
       
H4: Across country conditions, when all 
manipulation check questions are 
answered correctly, investing intentions 
are highest when tax management is low 
in both developed and developing 
countries, lower when tax management is 
high in developed countries, and lowest 
when tax management is high in 
developing countries (contrast weights: 
1.5, 1.5, -1, -2) 
1   1.25  0.2642 
H5: Across disclosure conditions, when 
all manipulation check questions are 
answered correctly, investing intentions 
are highest when CSR Report is present 
and tax management is low, lower when 
CSR Report is present and tax 
management is high and when CSR 
Report is absent and tax management is 
low, and lowest when CSR Report is 
absent and tax management is high 
(contrast weights: 1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
0.06 
  
0.8056 
      
      
      
      
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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TABLE 16 
Supplemental Analyses                                                   
Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results for Valuation of Stock              
Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 Analysis 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
        
Stock Valuation when CSR Disclosure is NOT Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n LS Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 15 40.8572 9.4582   26 38.9829 12.578 
                
High Tax Management 19 41.4425 10.8075   21 40.5509 8.7211 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n LS Mean S.D. n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 11 40.3435 10.1766   5 33.0209 14.2580 
                
High Tax Management 7 38.1657 16.0920   6 36.7193 12.9254 
                
Stock Valuation when CSR Disclosure is Provided 
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 0 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 13 40.0769 9.5963   12 38.1238 10.1970 
                
High Tax Management 27 39.4843 8.1067   20 42.6129 10.9516 
                
  Manipulation Checks Missed = 1 
  Developing   Developed 
  n 
LS 
Mean S.D.  n 
LS 
Mean S.D. 
Low Tax Management 7 44.0842 5.2915   7 33.1759 19.4770 
                
High Tax Management 3 44.5311 5.1316   7 40.2885 8.7069 
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Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Stock Valuation 
Source of Variation SS df MS  
F-
Stat 
p-
value  
Corrected Model 1208.2746 16 75.5172   0.64 0.8457   
Tax Management 126.0641 1 126.0641   1.07 0.3014   
Economic Development 354.2702 1 354.2702   3.02 0.0840   
CSR Report  83.1558 1 83.1558   0.71 0.4011   
Attention Check 74.7618 1 74.7618   0.64 0.4259   
Tax Man. x Att. Check 5.0431 1 5.0431   0.04 0.8360   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. 190.6813 1 190.6813   1.62 0.2041   
Tax Man. x Econ. Dev. x 
Att. Check 23.1082 1 23.1082   0.20 0.6578   
Tax Man. x CSR Report 32.4941 1 32.4941   0.28 0.5995   
Tax Man. x CSR Report x 
Att. Check 10.1404 1 10.1404   0.09 0.7692   
Tax Man. x Econ Dev. x 
CSR Report 13.1409 1 13.1049   0.11 0.7383   
Tax Man. x Ec. Dev. x 
CSR x Att. Check 6.0125 1 6.0125   0.05 0.8212   
Age 64.8520 1 64.8520   0.55 0.4583   
Error 22191.6915 189 117.4164         
* Interactions not of interest have been omitted from the above 
table         
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts               
Hypothesized Contrasts   df     F-Value   p-value 
H4: Across country conditions, when  
all manipulation check questions 
 are answered correctly, investing  
intentions are highest when tax 
 management is low in both developed 
 and developing countries, lower when  
tax management is high in developed  
countries, and lowest when tax  
management is high in developing  
countries (contrast weights:  
1.5, 1.5, -1, -2)  
1   0.49  0.4869 
       
H5: Across disclosure conditions, when 
all manipulation check questions are 
answered correctly, stock price valuation 
is highest when CSR Report is present 
and tax management is low, lower when 
CSR Report is present and tax 
management is high and when CSR 
Report is absent and tax management is 
low, and lowest when CSR Report is 
absent and tax management is high 
(contrast weights: 1.5, 1, 1, -3.5) 
1 
    
0.31 
  
0.5803 
      
      
      
      
Reported p-values are two-tailed.               
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APPENDIX A - INSTRUMENT 
 
***Introduction and IRB form omitted 
General Information 
Later, you will be asked to estimate the stock price of a company. The information 
included in the case is not intended to be completely representative of what would 
normally be available when you evaluate a company. Providing you with that level of 
detail would require more time to complete the case than could realistically be expected. 
Please make the best judgments you can based on the information provided in these 
materials. 
Company Background 
Industry Overview 
XYZ, Inc. is an American-based, publicly traded company that manufactures and sells 
athletic gear and footwear across the globe. Because the industry is highly concentrated, 
with a few major companies holding a large share of the market, athletic-wear 
manufacturers are very competitive. Consumer demand for affordable athletic wear has 
resulted in moderate performance for the industry as a whole. 
Company Overview 
XYZ is not one of the most recognized brands in the industry (compared to brands such 
as Nike or Adidas), but their products are generally thought to be as comfortable and 
durable as those made by the more recognized brands. The company sells their gear and 
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footwear at a moderate price, generally 10-15% less than products sold by their big-
name competitors. This positioning as a lower-cost, similar-quality brand is reflected in 
the company’s commitment to cut costs and to only incur expenses associated with its 
key operations and core values.    
 
Financial Information 
Current Year Performance Press Release 
 
You have received the following press release that was issued today by the company (as 
reported by Bloomberg Information Services). 
 
Headline: XYZ Announces 2017 Annual results 
Dateline: Rockford, IL 
Text: XYZ, Inc. (XYZ) today reported net income of $1.056 billion for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2017 versus $0.991 billion in fiscal 2016, an increase of $0.065 
billion.  
  
The following provides financial statement information included with the press release. 
This table compares XYZ’s results with those of its primary competitors and the overall 
industry average: 
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Media Report 
Following XYZ's press release, the media releases the following financial news report: 
Financial News   
During its 10 years in business, XYZ, Inc. has paid $8.6 million in corporate tax to the 
U.K. (Germany/Guatemala/Indonesia). 
XYZ, Inc. is valued at $15 billion and has generated more than $2 billion of sales in the 
U.K. (Germany/Guatemala/Indonesia) since 2008. 
It has paid 15% (25%) in corporate tax. 
In comparison, the rest of the athletic-wear industry paid an average of 25% of profits 
in corporate tax.  
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CSR Press Release 
CSR Following the above news release, XYZ, Inc. issued the following:  
 
 XYZ, Inc. Press Release   
At XYZ, Inc., we value our commitment to both our shareholders and the communities 
in which we operate. Following is a brief overview of our social, economic, and 
environmental impacts over the last 10 years. 
  
 Charitable Giving: We believe the local communities in which we operate should be 
supported through charitable giving. As such, we have dedicated a portion of all profits 
to donations to local schools and hospitals in the U.K. 
(Germany/Guatemala/Indonesia). 
  
 Sustainability: We share our stakeholders’ belief that a sustainable future is possible. 
We continue to improve our product processes to reduce our carbon footprint, and we 
adhere to the highest industry environmental standards. As such, we have instituted a 
recycling program in our U.K.(German/Guatemalan/Indonesian) operations to better 
support the environment.   
 
 Employee Safety: We believe training is a fundamental component of employee safety. 
We have maintained a comprehensive employee safety policy and training program 
in the U.K. (Germany/Guatemala/Indonesia) that industry peers have praised and 
replicated in their own facilities. 
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 Supply Chain: We continue to be a leader in combating labor rights abuses in our U.K. 
(German/Guatemalan/Indonesian) supply chains, and we work diligently to ensure all 
foreign workers within our supply chain are paid a livable wage and given access to 
affordable housing and health care. We have instituted a third-party due diligence 
program that has been successful in managing risks in our supply chain related to anti-
bribery and corruption, trade compliance, and child labor.  
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Hypothesis Questions 
Q1 Based on the information available to you, please state the extent to which you 
agree/disagree with the following statements: 
In my opinion, XYZ: 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
agree (5) 
Agree 
(6) 
Strongly 
agree (7) 
Follows 
high 
ethical 
standards   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Probably 
has a 
wonderful 
reputation  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Is 
concerned 
with 
improving 
the well-
being of 
society  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Is socially 
responsible  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Q2 Based on the information available to you, how much would you pay for a pair of 
XYZ’s athletic shoes? For comparison, a similar pair of Nike-brand shoes are sold for 
$120 and a similar pair of Adidas-brand shoes are sold for $110.  
 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 
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Q3 Assuming you have decided to purchase new athletic shoes and you believe XYZ’s 
shoes are reasonably priced, what is the likelihood (0-100%) you would purchase 
XYZ’s shoes rather than shoes from another brand? 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
   
 
 
 
Q4 Assuming you have decided to invest in an athletic-wear company, and based on the 
information available to you, what is the likelihood (0-100%) you would invest in 
XYZ? 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
   
 
 
 
Q5 Based on the information available to you, what is YOUR best estimate of the value 
of a share of XYZ stock? 
Analysts expect the stock to sell for between $30-$55 per share. 
  
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
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Saliency Checks 
Q6 In the media report, in what country was XYZ, Inc. said to have paid taxes? 
 -Germany 
 -The U.K. 
 -Guatemala 
 -Indonesia 
 -None of the Above  
Q7 In the media report, the industry average tax rate was 25% of profits. What 
percentage of profits had XYZ paid in taxes? 
 -25% 
 -15% 
 -8% 
 -0% 
Q8 In what community-driven activities was XYZ investing, per their press release? 
 -Charitable Giving 
 -Doctors without Borders 
 -None 
 -I received no press release from the company 
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Construct Validity 
Q9 How would you describe ${/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} in terms of economic 
development? 
Not at All Some Development 
A Moderate 
Amount of 
Development 
Almost Fully 
Developed 
Fully 
Developed 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q10 Given XYZ's tax rate compared to the industry average, how tax aggressive do you 
believe XYZ is with tax planning? 
Not 
Aggressive 
at All 
An 
Insignificant 
Amount 
A Little 
A 
Moderate 
Amount 
A 
Significant 
Amount 
A Lot Extremely Aggressive 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Insight Questions 
Q11 To what extent did the information about XYZ’s tax payments explain the 
following: 
 None at all (1) A little (2) 
A moderate 
amount (3) A lot (4) 
A great 
deal (5) 
Your choice of XYZ's 
stock price?  o  o  o  o  o  
Your willingness to 
invest in XYZ?  o  o  o  o  o  
Your choice of XYZ's 
shoes' selling price?  o  o  o  o  o  
Your willingness to 
purchase XYZ's 
product?  o  o  o  o  o  
Your assessment of 
XYZ's social 
responsibility?  o  o  o  o  o  
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Control Questions 
Q12 To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements? 
-Corporations have an equal duty to all of their stakeholders including employees, the 
government, the community, suppliers, shareholders, etc. 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-A corporation’s primary duty is to its shareholders 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-A corporation’s duty is to its shareholders, even if its decisions to benefit shareholders 
harm other stakeholders 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-I believe corporations are better situated than the government to address social 
problems 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
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-I believe companies have a moral duty to pay their fair share of taxes 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-Taxes are just like any other cost or expense of a company and should be minimized as 
much as legally possible 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-Paying taxes is a component of corporate social responsibility 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
- A company that does not do everything legally possible to reduce its taxes is 
defrauding its shareholders of potential profits 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
- A company that does not pay its fair share of taxes is defrauding the community it 
operates in, which benefits from the taxes of its citizens 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
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Q13 How many times have you evaluated a company’s performance by analyzing its 
financial statements (in a course or as part of an actual investment decision)? 
 -Never 
 -Once 
 -2-4 times 
 -5-9 times 
 -More than 10 times 
 
Q14 Which of the following best describes your economic views? 
Liberal/Neutral/Conservative 
 
Q15 Which of the following best describes your social views? 
Liberal/Neutral/Conservative 
 
Q16 What is your age? 
 
Q17 What is your gender? 
Male/Female 
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Q18 What is your annual household income? 
 
Q19 What is your highest level of formal education? 
 -Elementary School 
 -High School 
 -Some College 
 -Associate’s Degree 
 -College Graduate 
 -Some Graduate School 
 -Completed Graduate School 
 
Q20 What was your college major? 
 -Business 
 -Liberal Arts 
 -Science/Engineering 
 -Social Science 
 -Other 
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Q21 How many college courses have you taken in Accounting/Finance/Taxation? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 More 
than 5 
Accounting        
Finance        
Taxation        
 
 
 
 
Q22 Which of the following describes your household’s ownership of corporate stock? 
Check all that apply. 
   I/we own no corporate stock, either directly or through stock mutual funds. 
   I/we own stock in my employer, received through an employee stock-
ownership plan (aka ESOP). 
   I/we own stock via a stock mutual fund maintained in an employer-
sponsored retirement plan (e.g. a 401(K) plan). 
   I/we own stock outside of a retirement account primarily via indexed stock 
mutual funds (i.e. funds that invest in a broad cross-section of the stock market 
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with little or no active management) purchased directly from an investing 
company. 
   I/we own stock outside of a retirement account primarily via actively-
managed stock mutual funds (e.g. growth-, value-, industry-focused funds) 
purchased directly from an investment company. 
   I/we directly purchase (including purchasing through a broker) stocks in 
specific companies. 
   I/we have sold stock short. 
   I/we have dealt in call or put options. 
Q24 I would describe my knowledge of business and finance as:  
No Knowledge 
at All   
About the same as the 
general public   Expert 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Q25 I would describe my knowledge of the stock market and investing as:  
No Knowledge 
at All   
About the same as the 
general public   Expert 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
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Q26 Please indicate whether the below statements are true or false: 
Short-selling a stock means that the stock is sold 
without actually owning it 
 
True False 
Assuming an efficient stock market, it is not 
possible to beat the market in the long run 
True False 
 
Dividends are additional payments to the 
management of a company 
True False 
 
The abbreviation IPO refers to a financial 
regulatory authority which supervises the  
placement of securities at a stock exchange 
True False 
 
The Japanese stock index is called the Hang-Seng 
Index 
True False 
 
Compound interest refers to a situation in which 
the lending rate is larger than the borrowing rate 
True False 
 
A mutual fund with a growth strategy invests 
primarily in companies whose stock it believes is 
currently undervalued 
True False 
 
Q27-Q31 are tax morale questions 
 
 
 
 
 
